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Comment
The Toscin Has Sounded:t A Post-Mortem
Examination of Privity of Warranty in Pennsylvania
SCOPE
This comment will discuss the establishment and gradual erosion
of the defense of lack of privity. Enmeshed in the doctrine of caveat
emptor, the privity defense survived seventy-five years in the Amer-
ican law of negligence and another sixty years in assumpsit in Penn-
sylvania. Though not principally the subject of this comment, the
privity defense's development, exceptions and eventual abolition in
the tort area formed the foundation for its similar abolition in the
contract area.
The tort and contract characteristics of the breach of warranty
action have contributed substantially to the resolution of the privity
issue. Both the implied and express aspects of the action will be set
forth in order to build a framework upon which the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's incursion into the privity arena may be discussed.
The concepts of vertical and horizontal privity will be explored in
depth in relation to their treatment by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court over the past decade.
INTRODUCTION
Recent Pennsylvania case law' has brought the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's warranty of merchantability2 within the burgeoning con-
cept of strict liability in tort announced by section 402A.3 In terms
t The reader's attention is directed to the Duquesne Law Review's inaugural article:
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Toscin Sounded?, 1 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1963).
1. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974), aff'g 224 Pa. Super. 377,
307 A.2d 398 (1973); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-314 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
or the Code].
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as section 402A],
was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d
853, 854 (1966). Section 402A provides:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
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of the foreseeable plaintiff, defective product4 and recompensable
damages, the statutory5 and decisional' warranties have begun to
merge.' The "jurisprudential eclipse" 8 of these two theories is
founded upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recognition that
policy considerations underlying these approaches are precisely the
same: "the consumer's inability to protect himself adequately from
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
4. Under the strict liability and warranty approaches, emphasis is placed on proof of a
defective product, not on the manufacturer's conduct. Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler, & Don-
aher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 425, 429
(1974). Proving a defective product under section 402A or an unmerchantable good under the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 is, in all practicality, an identical burden for the injured
plaintiff. Rapson, Products Liability Under and Beyond the U. C. C., 2 U.C.C.L.J. 315, 319-
20 (1970).
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 to -315.
6. Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 143, 214 A.2d 694, 696 (1965).
7. Donovan, Recent Development in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The
Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 MAINE L. REv. 181, 233 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Donovan]. Though strict
liability and warranty eliminate privity and negligence as requirements of the product-related
prima facie case, a substantial number of unresolved issues still remain. The statute of
limitations problem is discussed in Murray, Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. PITT.
L. RE v. 255, 260-74 (1973); Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the
Search for a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 391, 416-22 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Murray]. In Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804 (1965), the author
identified:
[lImportant questions which must be resolved before any liability, whatever it is
called, can be imposed upon the manufacturer or seller: which potential plaintiffs are
protected; which manufacturers and sellers have a duty; what kind of defect is suffi-
cient and when must it exist; which parties bear what burdens of proof on the causation
issue; what affirmative defenses are available to the defendant; what damages may the
plaintiff recover; and, do the parties have power contractually to allocate the risk or
modify remedies otherwise available?
Id. at 813.
8. See Littlefield, Some Thoughts on Products Liability Law: A Reply to Professor
Shanker, 18 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 10 (1966); Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict
Products Liability, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 772 (1970); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of
Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential
Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 WESTERN RES. L. REv. 5 (1965).
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defectively manufactuered goods; . . . the implied assurance on the
part of the seller that his goods are safe; . .. [and] the superior
risk-bearing ability of the manufacturer."9 The issue of the plain-
tiff's standing to seek recovery in a product-related personal injury
case has been identified as a matter of policy. 0
Striking a balance between the interest of the consumer" in re-
covering damages for injuries suffered due to a defective product
and the interest of the seller 2 in making a profit from the sale of the
product is no simple task. Both sectors of the sales transaction have
legitimate claims to judicial and legislative protection, for the
seller's right to make a living and the individual's right to be free
from physical intrusion are mainsprings of our democratic society.
These rights have undergone adjustments as a consequence of a
widespread solicitude for the vulnerable consumer" and a focus
upon enterprise,' rather than individual, liability. The principle of
caveat emptor has long been eroded by exceptions, such as a duty
to reveal hidden defects, actions for fraud, and the creation of im-
plied warranty. 5 The principle's force has been tempered by the
widespread acceptance of the warranty/strict liability approach to
recovery. In the area of implied warranty protection, judicial activ-
ity was directed toward the equalization of the opposing forces, as
chronicled by Judge Wanamaker in the early 1920's:
9. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 230 n.6, 246 A.2d 848, 854 n.6 (1968).
10. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 1974); Kassab v. Central
Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968).
11. The term "consumer" will be used herein to generally refer to all those physically
affected by defective goods. It will be utilized in the sense of a legal conclusion for the
reasonably foreseeable injured consumer, user or affected party whether a purchaser or not.
12. The term "seller" will be used herein interchangeably with manufacturer, original
seller, distributor, dealer, retailer, restaurant operator, contractor or any other individual
fitting within the scope of the term "seller" as comprehended by section 402A.
13. Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability- With A Close Look at Section 402A and
the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 440 (1969).
14. Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944), established the "risk-spreading" argument by recognizing
the injured party's typical inability to cope with the overwhelming misfortune which had
befallen him and the manufacturer's ability to insure against such a risk by distributing it
among the purchasing public "as a cost of doing business." See Ehrenzweig, Products Liabil-
ity in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and
Insurable Laws": II, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv 791, 799-800 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The
Fall]: Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1120-22 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault].
15. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Gillam]; Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1940).
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It may be urged that this is a substantial modification of the
old doctrine of caveat emptor, let the buyer beware. Is it not
high time, however, that that doctrine should be somewhat
modified; at least that it should have no higher place in the
business life of a nation than the companion doctrine, "let the
seller beware."
There is entirely too much disregard of la* and truth in the
business, social, and political world of to-day. I am using this
term in its broad sense. Constitutions, statutes, sound legal
and ethical principles are becoming little more than mere
scraps of paper, not only between individuals, but among
states and nations.
It is time to hold men to their primary engagements to tell
the truth and observe the law of common honesty and fair
dealing. Such a change, in my judgment, would not be so much
in the line of revolution as in the line of reasonable reform.
Honest men need not fear it; dishonest men should be kept in
fear of it."
Whether the scales have tipped beyond the balance sought by the
drafters of section 402A is not the subject of this comment. An
underlying assumption of this writer, as stated at the outset, is the
fusion of the concepts of strict liability and warranty into a principle
of consumer protection.
The acceptance of this principle necessitates the rejection of (1)
negligence law's emphasis upon the wrongful conduct of the defen-
dant and (2) sales law's requirement of privity. 17 These develop-
ments form the groundwork for a recovery based on proof of a defec-
tive product sold by one with the requisite duty to the plaintiff.
Given the arguments for granting the consumer the protection of the
implied warrant/strict liability cause of action, the logical relevance
of the privity doctrine dissolves into the tort concept of foreseeabil-
ity.
The confused court treatment of the judicially created 8 and legis-
latively bolstered 9 privity doctrine-has reflected the varied philo-
16. Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 338-39, 140 N.E. 118, 121
(1922).
17. Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REV. 804, 807 (1965).
18. The common law rule of privity of contract can be traced to Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
19. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides:
§2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied
Vol. 13: 53
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sophical orientations of the judges with respect to the socio-
economic interrelations of the manufacturer, others in the distribu-
tive chain, the consumer, user, and those affected by the use of the
goods."0 For example, the application of privity of warranty to non-
food cases" in Pennsylvania fell from a position of strength to seem-
ing obliteration in the 1940's and 1950's.1 However, by the mid-
1960's the doctrine was again revived and flourishing." This re-
newed viability was short-lived, for the recent lethal blows inflicted
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have left the defense of lack of
privity in practical ruin.4 The following will serve as a post-mortem
examination of the subject's history and remains.
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is
in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
20. See Justice Eagen's opinion in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 615-17,
187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963) (the employee of the purchaser "is a complete stranger to any
contractual transaction. involved"), followed by Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 391-92, 221 A.2d
320, 324-25 (1966) (Cohen, J.); id. at 395-96, 221 A.2d at 326-27 (Bell, C.J., concurring).
Compare Miller v. Preitz supra at 411, 221 A.2d at 334 (Jones, J., concurring & dissenting),
with Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968):
As far back as 1931 the seeds of discontent were sown in the field of privity when
Justice Cardozo said in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441,
445, 74 A.L.R. 1139 (1931): "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in
these days apace." Since that historic decision the citadel has all but crumbled to dust
in this area of product liability. Courts and scholars alike have recognized that the
typical consumer does not deal at arm's length with the party whose product he buys.
Rather, he buys from a retail merchant who is usually little more than an economic
conduit. It is not the merchant who has defectively manufactured the product. Nor is
it usually the merchant who advertises the product on such a large scale as to attract
consumers. We have in our society literally scores of large, financially responsible
manufacturers who place their wares in the stream of commerce not only with the
realization, but with the avowed purpose, that these goods will find their way into the
hands of the consumer. Only the consumer will use these products; and only the
consumer will be injured by them should they prove defective ...
Id. at 227-28, 246 A.2d at 852-53 (Roberts, J.).
21. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 394, 221 A.2d 320, 326 (1966) (Bell, C.J., concurring);
Id. at 405, 221 A.2d at 331 (Jones, J., concurring & dissenting).
22. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 449-50 (3d Cir. 1946); Thompson v. Reed-
man, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156
A.2d 568 (1959).
23. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.,
409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Marcus v. Spada Bros. Auto Serv., 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 794
(C.P. Phila. Co. 1967); Kaczmarkiewicz v. J.A. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 14 (C.P.
Allegh. Co. 1957).
24. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974); Kassab v. Central Soya,
432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT- Winterbottom v. Wright
Obviously intending to grossly oversimplify the subject, the late
Dean Prosser wrote:
The law of products liability began with the case of
Winterbottom v. Wright . . . which has been described as a
fishbone in the throat of the law."
This "often cited, misinterpreted, and much maligned case"" in-
volved multiple contractual obligations. 7 The defendant had leased
a coach to plaintiffs employer. Under the terms of the lease defen-
dant agreed to keep the coach in repair. While plaintiff, a coach-
man, was operating the coach, it broke down, hurling plaintiff from
his seat s into the legal spotlight with over 130 years of diminishing
radiance.
At the time the case was decided, negligence was not a clearly
defined basis for liability since the distinction between tort and
contract was blurred."z Plaintiff averred what would appear to have
been tortious injury but he grounded liability on a breach of con-
tractual duty.30 In his demurrer the defendant argued that whenever
a wrong arises out of a breach of contract, only a party thereto may
bring suit.3'
25. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER], citing Winterbottom v. Wright. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
26. Donovan, supra note 7, at 183. Professor Gillam chronicled:
The sad history of Winterbottom v. Wright is a testimonial to the force of precedent,
but otherwise it challenges the vital processes of the common law. The case led the
"law of negligence . ..into a wilderness of single instances," in which escape was
sought from the relentless pursuit of an archaic principle based upon "doubtful pol-
icy," springing from "an inherent fallacy" and supported by only a "gloss of author-
ity." The critical literature of the law condemns it unanimously and vehemently; the
bench is more cautious, but, apart from the initial opinion, little judicial support of
the case is to be found. For all this, the privity rule is not yet dead; it may be that
nothing less than the sovereign power of the legislature will suffice to make its quietus.
Roman experience suggests the possible fruitfulness of this approach.
Gillam, supra note 15, at 150.
27. A lease and repair contract with the owner of the mail coach; an independent contract
with the plaintiff's employer to provide horses and coachmen; and the plaintiffs employment
contract. 152 Eng. Rep. at 402-03.
28. Id. at 403.
29. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 318.5, at 1039 (1956); Donovan, supra
note 7. at 183.
30. 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
31. Now it is a general rule, that wherever a wrong arises merely out of the breach
of a contract. . . the party who made the contract alone can sue. . . .If the rule were
Vol. 13: 53
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In sustaining the defendant's demurrer, the court noted that
plaintiff's emphasis on Langridge v. Levy32 was misguided," thus,
leaving the plaintiff without basis for recovery.34 With the focus of
the demurrer upon defendant's contractual obligation and the
spectre of "an infinity of actions" looming large in the court's mind,
Lord Abinger stated what has been quoted innumerable times:
There is not privity of contract between these parties; and if
the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person pass-
ing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the
coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the oper-
ation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which
I can see no limit, would ensue5.3
Baron Alderson also concerned himself with placing a limit on-those
who are entitled to sue under those circumstances,3  while Baron
Rolfe found that the defendant only had a duty to the one with
whom he contracted, i.e., the plaintiff's employer. 7 Though Lord
Abinger mentioned "this action in tort" the decision turned on the
issue of the defendant's contractual liability."
Thus, Winterbottom held that no action could be maintained
upon a contract by one who was not a party to it.39 Recognition that
the case was decided solely in contract, however, did not come for
over sixty years4 and was not judicially established in England until
1932. 11 During this period of universal misapprehension by English
otherwise, and privity of contract were not requisite, there would be no limit to such
actions. If the plaintiff may, as in this case, run through the length of three contracts,
he may run through any number or series of them; and the most alarming consequences
would follow the adoption of such a principle.
Id.
32. 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
33. 152 Eng. Rep. at 404. (The plaintiff in Langridge v. Levy was successful in recovering
for a knowing, false representation by the seller who had knowledge of the intended use of
the article by both the buyer and his sons).
34. Id. at 405.
35. Id.
36. Id. See also Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 U.
PA. L. Ray. 209 (1905) [hereinafter cited as Bohlen]. He maintained that although rights of
persons not in privity cannot be enlarged by contract, neither could they be restricted.
37. 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
38. Id. at 405; Gillam, supra note 15, at 133.
39. Gillam, supra note 15, at 133.
40. Bohlen, supra note 36, at 284.
41. M'Alister v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.).
1974
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and American courts, the case was considered to stand for the prop-
osition that a party seeking recovery in contract or tort for injuries
resulting from the defective condition of goods must be in privity of
contract with the one against whom he seeks to maintain an ac-
tion.4
By the turn of the twentieth century, there was majority support
for the requirement of privity to bring an action in tort or contract
against the manufacturer, contractor, or vendor, notwithstanding
the unpersuasive rationale of Winterbottom. The doctrine's general
acceptance, despite the weakness of its legal underpinnings,43 would
seem to indicate a socio-economic, rather than legal, justification
for adherence to the privity defense." Courts protected the manu-
facturer from the potential hardships45 of being held accountable for
injuries to every consumer, however contractually or geographically
remote, by characterizing such injuries as unanticipated and re-
mote. The combination of judicial inertia and the continuance of
the favored status accorded to manufacturing in its infancy eventu-
ally lost its effect when a marketing system developed with concom-
itant layers of middlemen; utilization of the media to promote sales
replaced the direct sales approach; and it became generally recog-
42. Huset v. J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 868-69 (8th Cir. 1903); PROSSER,
supra note 25, at 641; Gillam, supra note 15, at 133. See, e.g., Simone v. John J. Felin & Co.,
35 Pa. D. & C. 645, 649 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1939).
43. Bohlen, supra note 36, at 289-310.
44. Cf. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.1, at 24 (1965).
45. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 642; cf. Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199,
199 A.2d 875 (1964), in which a private water company was held liable for negligent mainte-
nance and inspection of fire hydrants in the vicinity of the plaintiff's home which was con-
sumed by flames as a result of the hydrant's inoperability at the time of the fire. The
defendant company contended, inter alia, that it had no duty to the plaintiff, but rather to
the municipality, with whom it had contracted to perform its services. In a lengthy response,
the Court per Justice Musmanno, cited Justice Cardozo's decision in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and stated:
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal Jeremiahs have moaned that if financial
responsibility were imposed in the accomplishment of certain enterprises, the ensuing
litigation would be great, chaos would reign and civilization would stand still. It was
argued that if railroads had to be responsible for their acts of negligence, no company
could possibly run trains; if turnpike companies had to pay for harm done through
negligence, no roads would be built; if municipalities were to be financially liable for
damage done by their motor vehicles, their treasuries would be depleted. Nevertheless
liability has been imposed in accordance with elementary rules of justice and the moral
code, and civilization in consequence, has not been bankrupted, nor have the courts
been inundated with confusion.
414 Pa. at 218-19, 199 A.2d at 884.
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nized that strict adherence to the rule promoted harsh results in the
individual case. 46
THE FALL OF PRIVITY IN TORT
The general rule of liability of the original party only to his imme-
diate buyer was "easiest to attack . . . where it was extended
farthest: in tort." 7 The foreseeability of the injured consumer, a
criteria not recognized by the Winterbottom court, became readily
cognizable. This emerging recognition led to the acceptance of the
manufacturer's tort duty to a third person affected by the former's
conduct. 8
Prior to judicial acceptance of foreseeability, a barrage of excep-
tions to the privity doctrine" developed, foreshadowing a change in
social philosophy. The first exception was for inherently dangerous
products and soon found judicial acceptance in England -and the
United States.5 The privity doctrine was also found to be inapplica-
ble to cases of willful injury,52 fraud," or where the manufactured
article had been supplied by the invitor for uses by business invitees
on the former's premises.54
46. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 228, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968); PRossER, supra
note 25, at 641-42; Donovan, supra note 7, at 184; Gillam, supra note 15, at 138.
47. Gillam, supra note 15, at 138.
48. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 642; Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate
Consumer, 21 Ky. L.J. 388, 401 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Russell].
49. See Gillam, supra note 15, at 152-55, wherein the author compiled twenty-nine tech-
niques by which the courts have avoided the privity doctrine.
50. Citing Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837), the concept of inherent danger
was recognized by defendant's counsel in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404
(Ex. 1842). Though the court distinguished Langridge by reason of the "distinct fraud" and
the defendant's knowledge of the ultimate users, the inherently dangerous distinction was
established nine years later. Longmeid v. Holliday, 155 Eng. Rep. 752, 755 (Ex. 1851).
51. In Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852), a drug manufacturer mislabeled a jar of
bellodonna as dandelion and sold it to a second druggist who sold it to a third, from whom it
was purchased by plaintiffs husband. Mrs. Thomas's reaction to the drug was severe rather
than recuperative (the medicine was prescribed by her doctor and administered by her hus-
band). Her negligence action against the manufacturer was successful. The court distin-
guished her case from Winterbottom since the "natural and almost inevitable consequence"
of the druggist/manufacturer's negligence was "death or great bodily harm . . . the defen-
dant's negligence put human life in imminent danger." Id. at 409.
52. Gillam, supra note 15, at 140.
53. Liability without the requirement of privity for fraudulent representation by the man-
ufacturer was explicated in Langridge v. Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
54. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903); Gillam,
supra note 15, at 140 & n.75.
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The inherently dangerous exceptions had two branches: one origi-
nating in Thomas v. Winchester"5 and the other finding its basis in
Langridge v. Levy." As this exception developed, its scope spread
from medicines, 7 to food and beverages58 and to a wide variety of
products, though not without considerable debate." The exception
received increasing judicial acceptance until MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co. ." In MacPherson, the court shunned reliance on the "ver-
bal niceties" of the inherently dangerous exception and based the
defendant manufacturer's liability squarely upon a responsibility to
the consumer to use reasonable care to avoid injury to him when
danger from negligent manufacture is reasonably foreseeable.,,
MacPherson and its progeny established the rule that the manufac-
turer is liable in tort to a consumer who may reasonably be expected
to suffer injury from a defectively manufactured product. 2 Justice
Cardozo broadly declared that there was no place for privity in the
law of negligence,6" signaling the passing of the negligence defense
of privity and the emergence of the rule of foreseeability."
WARRANTY-A CURIOUS HYBRID OF TORT AND CONTRACT
The evolution from MacPherson to strict liability in tort has been
recounted many times and is not the subject of this comment. At
55. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See Elkins, Bly & Co. v. McKean, 79 Pa. 493, 502 (1875).
56. 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837). The distinction between the Thomas exception and the
Langridge exception is that the former pertains to imminently dangerous articles which cause
harm resulting from the defendant's negligence, while the latter refers to knowing misrepre-
sentation of the imminently dangerous article's qualities. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 F. 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1903).
57. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
58. The courts generally recognized a special responsibility on the part of the "purveyor
of victuals for human consumption." Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1103-10.
59. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 642; Gillam, supra note 15, at 140.
60. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). MacPherson sued for injuries, alleging the manu-
facturer's negligent failure to make a reasonable inspection of the automobile which collapsed
when a wheel crumbled.
61. Finding the Thomas principle applicable to more than poisons, explosives and other
things which normally operate as "implements of destruction," the MacPherson court held
the manufacturer to a duty of due care to the ultimate purchaser. 217 N.Y. at 389-90, 111
N.E. at 1053.
62. PROSSER, supra note 25. at 642-43; Donovan, supra note 7, at 186; Gillam, supra note
15. at 142; Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1100-03.
63. 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053. Accord, Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa.
601, 611, 23 A.2d 743, 749 (1942); Donovan, supra note 7, at 185-86.
64. The concept of foreseeability is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395
(1948). See also Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937); Russell, supra note 48, at 399-400.
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this point, what is important is that the fortress surrounding the
requirement of privity in negligence had fallen in 1916,65 and by
1931: "The assault upon the citadel of privity [was] proceeding in
[those] days apace."" The vestiges of Winterbottom v. Wright
remaining after Justice Cardozo's assault can be succinctly phrased:
where there is not privity of contract, there can be no breach of
warranty.
An action for breach of warranty originally sounded solely in tort.
It was an action upon the case to recover for a breach of assumed
duty. Until 1689, the action was akin to deceit for it redressed a
wrong flowing from a fraudulent misrepresentation. The action re-
tained its tort character, though it would then lie for a false, though
innocent, affirmation of fact. By 1797, the breach of warranty was
still referred to as a form of fraud, despite recognition of the express
warranty for fifty years as a term of the contract of sale and twenty
years as a basis upon which an action in assumpsit would lie for its
breach." As assumpsit began to overshadow tort as the basis for a
breach of warranty action, the issue became a matter of contract
interpretation to determine the parties' intentions: Was there such
a positive representation of fact, as intended by the parties, which
induced the bargain?
Williston has criticized such focus upon the agreement as
unnecessary since the express warranty was imposed by law." The
suggestion that warranties were imposed by law, independent of the
seller's intention, found quick judicial acceptance. The law of im-
plied warranty grew as reputable sellers increasingly assumed re-
sponsibility for the sale of defective goods and society began to
impose this obligation on the seller who could then distribute the
loss to the consuming public. Breach of warranty became more than
a breach of contract, for both an action in tort and contract could
be maintained by the injured consumer."
65. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
66. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
67. For extensive treatment of the historical development see Ames, History of
Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1888); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Implied Warranty].
68. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS §§ 196, 197 (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as 1 S.
WILLISTON]. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 635, wrote:
But the obligation is imposed upon the seller, not because he has assumed it voluntar-
ily, but because the law attaches such consequences to his conduct irrespective of any
agreement; and in many cases, at least, to hold that a warranty "is a contract is to
speak the language of pure fiction."
69. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 68, § 197.
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A "curious hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and con-
tract, unique in the law,''7 0 warranty survived this "legal
miscegenation"' to produce legitimate offspring: the original deci-
sional tort form of action" and the statutory express and implied
warranties associated with the contract. 3 The problem with such a
delineation is that the two are not truly separate animals, as verified
by their similar genetic structure. Further, the two result in the
same obligation to the seller, which is imposed not because of any
voluntary assumption, but because the law attaches such conse-
quences to his undertakings."
Practically speaking, this hybrid action for breach of warranty
has benefited procedurally from its tort nature. The courts have
allowed the more liberal tort rule of damages, permitted recovery for
wrongful death," abated a cause of action which did not survive the
death of the wrongdoer,"5 and shortened the period of limitation."
Substantively, its tort character has been utilized to cause the infu-
sion of notions of misrepresentation (whether innocent or not); the
consumer's reliance upon the retailer's knowledge, skill or
judgment; and implied assertions of the character of the goods into
the law of implied warranty.
Upon the premise that the tort character of the action is not only
procedurally but substantively important to the parties, a strong
argument can be made to extend warranty protection beyond the
confines of technical privity. 5 With respect to this proposition,
Prosser declared:
70. PROSSER. supra note 25, at 634.
71. Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HARV. L.
REv. 414, 415 (1929).
72. The action can be maintained without proving intentional misrepresentation or negli-
gence. Gillam, supra note 15, at 127. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1126. This
writer views the decisional warranties as the precursors of strict liability in tort (section
402A).
73. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-313 to -315.
74. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 634; 1 S. WILUSTON, supra note 68, § 197, at 507.
75. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 635; Gillam, supra note 15, at 127.
76. Gosling v. Nichols, 59 Cal. App. 2d 442, 139 P.2d 86 (1943).
The gravamen of a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty that food is fit
for human consumption is the personal injury which results, and the action "sounds
in tort." The cause of action is not ex contractu. Therefore, the plaintiff's cause of
action abated upon the defendant's death which "occurred prior to the time the action
was ready for rendition of a final judgment."
Id. at 444, 139 P.2d at 87.
77. PROSSER, supra note 25, at 635.
78. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 414, 161 A.2d 69, 100 (1960);
Gillam, supra note 15. at 145-49.
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The conclusion from all this is obvious. If warranty is a mat-
ter of tort as well as contract, and if it can arise without any
intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no
contract; and it may arise and exist between parties who have
not dealt with one another. 9
Underlying Prosser's logic was his general dissatisfaction with es-
tablishing strict liability in the law of sales. Supported by Justice
Traynor'" and a growing number of advocates,' Prosser disputed the
relative merit of a warranty action in contract to perform the func-
tion for which strict liability in tort was developed. To sustain his
argument that an action for breach of warranty under the law of
sales carries far too much luggage in the way of undesireable compli-
cations, Prosser compiled a comprehensive enumeration of the bur-
densome elements of such a product-related personal injury cause
of action."2 Amidst this impressive enumeration, however, it must
not be forgotten that the "contractual. classification" of warranty
has brought considerable benefits to injured consumers. The defen-
dant's escape routes through proof that he is not guilty of misrepre-
sentation, fraud or negligence, or that the plaintiff is guilty of con-
tributory negligence or unjustifiable reliance, are no longer open.81
"With the sweet, however, has come the bitter - the acrid con-
cept of privity." ' Privity, along with other intricacies of sales law
was designed specifically to facilitate the commercial relationship
between the buyer and seller. By making consumer protection de-
pendent upon it, the status of third parties to the contract is left
unprotected."
79. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1127.
80. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REV. 363 (1965).
81. Donovan, supra note 7, Gillam, supra note 15; Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for
Defective Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30 (1965); Noel,
Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32 TENN. L. REV. 207 (1965).
82. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1127-34.
83. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 281 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Ezer].
84. Id. at 322.




Privity is a conclusory term representing the doctrine which re-
quires an injured plaintiff to establish a contractual relation with
the defendant as a prerequisite to recovery of damages caused by
defective goods. The doctrine was merely a shorthand expression of
the facts and circumstances from which the court could infer a
particular relationship between the parties. Hence, for the manufac-
turer to have been found liable, his responsibility must have derived
from the contract or warranties arising out of the sales transaction.
In particular, the protection of warranties extended only to the par-
ties in privity of contract. Privity of warranty, created, and devel-
oped for the "horse and buggy""6 age of Winterbottom v. Wright,
though an anachronism in its own time,"1 has at long last been
placed in a well-deserved resting place - the shelves of the law
library.
The decision in Winterbottom v. Wright revealed the court's so-
licitude for manufacturers, protecting them from a multiplicity of
suits by finding that no duty was owing the injured plaintiff. How-
ever, the circuity of actions which this barrier of privity necessitated
could not have been the result Lord Abinger was seeking. In place
of the supposed "infinity of actions" and consequent injustice
worked upon the manufacturer, the redress for injury-causing defec-
tive goods now could only be reached through a series of successful
lawsuits back through the marketing chain. The question of duty
merges with the concern over multiplicity when viewed from the
perspective "of foreseeability. The manufacturer only owes a duty of
care to those whom an ordinary and reasonably prudent man should
foresee would be injured by his defective goods. The manufacturer
would escape responsibility in those cases where the court would
choose to find that the plaintiff was unforeseeable, and thus multi-
plicity could be controlled.
Couched in terms of duty, the Pennsylvania courts have clearly
enunciated the relevant issues regarding privity:
(1) vertical privity-"from whom does the warranty run?" 8
86. Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L. Ry.
551 (1941).
87. Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Toscin Sounded? 1 Duq. L. REV. 1, 2 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Jaeger].
88. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 379, 307 A.2d 398, 400 (1973).
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(2) horizontal privity-"to whom does the warranty run?" 89
VERTICAL PRIVTY-FROM WHOM DOES THE WARRANTY RUN?
Vertical privity involves the various members of the distributive
chain" who buy to resell the goods, ending with and including the
ultimate purchaser. Under this doctrine a purchaser of a product
injured as a result of a breach of warranty, only had a cause of action
against his immediate seller of the defective product. It may very
well be that the immediate seller contributed little if anything to
the plaintiff's injuries, except to the extent of acting as a conduit
for the passage of the defective goods to the purchaser. The series
of sales involved in the distributive chain, each conceptually being
made only to the immediate buyer, has tended to create a barrier
preventing any legal connection between remote, though vertical,
parties to a lawsuit. Whether this vertical insulation was created by
the manufacturers in an attempt to withdraw from liability, or
whether it was simply accepted as a welcomed consequence of a
necessary marketing practice, is immaterial. The recognition that
the established manufacturing, marketing and finance mechanism
is a continuum, not a series of unrelated and individual acts, has
decidedly influenced the legislative and judicial trend to the buyer."
Professor Murray has asked "who can be sued?" Prior to Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968), his answer for breach of warranty actions in Pennsylvania
was simple enough: in the human consumption cases, the purchaser may sue any party
upward (vertically) in the distributive chain. In non-consumption cases, he was rele-
gated to an action against his immediate seller.
Murray, supra note 7, at 395.
Justice Jones, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, first asked "who can be sued,"
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 399, 221 A.2d 320, 328 (1966), and the Miller court responded
in substantially the same manner as Professor Murray outlined above. 422 Pa. at 391-92, 221
A.2d at 324-25.
89. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 379, 307 A.2d 398, 400 (1973).
Professor Murray has asked "who can sue?" Prior to Salvador, his answer for breach of
warranty actions in Pennsylvania was more restrictive than his response to the question of
"who can be sued."
[I]n the human consumption cases, while the purchaser could sue any seller on a
warranty theory, he alone could bring the action. In the non-consumption cases where
the actual purchaser was limited to the immediate seller (retailer), he alone could
bring the action.
Murray, supra note 7, at 395-96.
Justice Jones, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller, first asked "who can sue,"
422 Pa. 383, 399, 221 A.2d 320, 328 (1966), but the Hochgertel court had previously settled
the issue as Professor Murray observed above. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610,
614-15, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963).
90. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3.
91. Gillam, supra note 15, at 150. Indicative of legislative and judicial reflection of the
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Therefore, the relevant consideration for solving the vertical privity
issue becomes a matter of the manufacturer's status and obligations
founded in law: "who, besides the immediate seller, is liable to the
consumer for injuries caused by the defective product?"92
HORIZONTAL PRIvITY-To WHOM DOES THE WARRANTY RUN?
Horizontal privity, on the other hand, focuses on the injured
third-party, not the defendant. The suit originates from a position
lateral to the relevant sale by the retailer or reseller. Technically,
the term relates only to the third party's suit against the last pur-
chaser's immediate seller. 3 Be that as it may, the term as used
herein will encompas both horizontal and diagonal privity. The
latter concept is descriptive of the third party's action against those
higher than the immediate seller in the marketing chain. Though
some find diagonal privity a relatively more important element of
the doctrine than horizontal privity,94 the term's use appears to be
unnecessary, but analytically correct. It has been utilized in some
law review articles but not mentioned by the Pennsylvania courts. 5
Instead, they have taken a legitimately mechanical approach to
third-party recovery by treating the issues of vertical and horizontal
privity separately. A final clamber up the marketing ladder can only
be attempted after the issue of horizontal privity has been re-
social climate, public policy arguments countered the principles of privity and caveat emptor.
Originally imposed as a safeguard for developing industry, the concept of privity, has of
necessity, been weakened with the increasing strength of industry. There has been a growing
realization that industrialization and commercialization have tended to create a disparity in
the bargaining power and pecuniary ability between the manufacturing/marketing enterprise
and the individual purchaser. Hence, the need for consumer protection gave rise to the
creation of implied warranties which presaged the abatement of the once viable defense of
lack of privity.
92. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 232, 246 A.2d 848, 855 (1968).
93. Ezer, supra note 83, at 326-27.
94. Id. at 323. After defining vertical and horizontal privity, Donovan, supra note 7, wrote:
Diagonal privity is the catch-all term covering the remaining suits brought by the
buyer or a "beneficiary of his questionable largess," not against the last reseller but
against someone on a higher plane in the distributive chain, generally the
manufacturer.
Id. at 218.
95. The term was not used in Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968);
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa.




solved." Utilizing a judicially created theory 7 or statutory author-
ity,9" the courts have placed an injured party, other than a pur-
chaser, in the same legal position as the purchaser in order to estab-
lish horizontal privity by determining: "Who, besides the pur-
chaser, has a right of action against the manufacturer or seller of a
defective product?""
EROSION OF THE PRIVITY DEFENSE-INTRODUCTION
Despite the Third Circuit's pronouncement in 1946 that the re-
quirement of privity of warranty had been "obliterated" from Penn-
sylvania law,1' ° vertical privity's formal demise was not met until
1968.101 As for horizontal privity, it was mortally wounded in the
spring of 1974.102 While by the mid-1960's the Pennsylvania courts
had generally held that the injured party's right of recovery for
breach of warranty in non-food cases was available only to the pur-
chaser (or one of the specifically enumerated beneficiaries in section
2-318) against the last reseller, 0 3 the strength of that general rule
had been riddled with exceptions. 4 These exceptions evidenced
judicial dissatisfaction growing since the dragon of privity first
raised its ugly head. However, this inescapable trend did not imme-
diately lead the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the conclusion that
the public policy had begun to swing from the harshness of caveat
emptor to the protection of the injured consumer.
Since the legal foundation for the demise of the privity doctrine
lies in the policy manifest in its exceptions, an analysis of the major
ones, for foodstuffs and express representation, would be instruc-
tive. As these exceptions have their conceptual ties to the character
of the warranty, this discussion will also incorporate the distinction
96. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 390, 221 A.2d 320, 324 (1966); Murray, supra note 7, at
395-96; see Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section
2-318, 68 DICK. L. REV. 444 (1964).
97. Salvador extends the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S § 2-318 warranty protection to
employees. Prior to that section's enactment, courts used legal fictions to evade the doctrine
of privity. See Gillam, supra note 15; text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
98. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318. Prior to Salvador, the Code extended the pur-
chaser's warranty protection to his family, household or house guests.
99. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 232, 246 A.2d 848, 855 (1968).
100. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1946).
101. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
102. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974).
103. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 394, 221 A.2d 320, 326 (1966) (Bell, C.J., concurring).
104. See cases and commentary cited notes 49-54 supra.
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between express and implied warranties, a distinction initially re-
lied upon by the courts as a means of limiting the scope of the
doctrine's erosion. 105
EROSION OF THE PRIVIT-Y DOCTRINE-EXPRESS WARRANTY
The courts seized upon the express nature of representations and
advertisements in carving out an exception to the privity doctrine
for these express warranties. As extensive advertising by all mem-
bers of the marketing chain is a necessary concomitant of the mass
marketing system, the early form of the exception has been easily
molded into the context of today's consumerism. 1'1
Until the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act in 1915, I01 Pennsyl-
vania retained without substantial change the three hundred year
old English law of express warranty.08 As the lone follower of the
repudiated English decision of Chandelor v. Lopus,'09 Pennsylvania
required that the warrantor had to intend to warrant;"0 for no war-
105. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods, contempora-
neously with, and as a part of, the contract of sale, although collateral to the express
object of it. having reference to the character, quality, or title of the goods, and by
which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then
represents -them. A warranty is express when the seller makes an affirmation with
respect to the article to be sold, pending the treaty of sale, on which it is intended that
the buyer shall rely in making the purchase; and there is authority for the proposition
that any warranty derived from express language should be considered an express
warranty. A warranty is implied when the law derives it by implication or inference
from the nature of the transaction, or the relative situation or circumstances of the
parties. Stated otherwise, an express warranty is one imposed by the parties to the
contract, while an implied warranty is not one of the contractual elements of an
agreement but is, instead, imposed by law.
Id. at 94-95.
106. See notes 129-32 infra. In Salvador, the supreme court observed:
Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his
product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. We have decided that
no current societal interest is served by permitting the manufacturer to place a defec-
tive article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages
caused by the defect.
319 A.2d at 907.
107. Law of May 19, 1915, No. 241, [1915] Pa. Laws 543 (repealed 1954) [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM SALFs Acr].
108. Jaeger. supra note 87, at 28.
109. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. 1791). (Defendant Goldsmith presented a jewel as a precious
stone; it was not. The Court of the Exchequer found no cause of action, holding this to be a
bare affirmation).
-110. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 60 (Pa. 1839); Borrekins v. Bevan & Porter, 3
Rawle 22, 45-46 (Pa. 1831).
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ranty, express or implied, arose from the mere "naked averment of
fact.""' Further, the courts refused to imply a warranty from such
an averment. The only implied warranty recognized was one of
soundness of title."'2 Other constructive warranties were considered
legally inconsistent with the virtues of the rule of caveat emptor.
Rather, the wronged party's action was in deceit for willful
misrepresentation of quality."' Although the modem trend was well
established to the contrary," 4 by the end of the nineteenth century,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still held that mere assertions of
fact neither established a warranty nor were evidence of one."5
Following the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, the Pennsyl-
vania legislature defined express warranty as "any affirmation of
fact or any promise" which naturally induced the buyer to purchase
the goods in reliance thereon."' Section 12 defined express warranty
by codifying the common law."7 In so doing, this section eradicated
the Pennsylvania view relating to the seller's intent."8
With respect to express warranty, it would seem that the require-
ment of privity should have remained irrevocably attached. The
warranty obligations of the "seller" ran to the "buyer" in a context
that undoubtedly would seem to refer only to the immediate parties
to the sale. The definitional section" 9 bolstered this interpretation
which would appear to comport with the notion of an express war-
ranty as arising from an agreement between the parties to the trans-
action. The nature of the seller's obligation was contractual, regard-
less of whether the positive affirmations were expressly incorporated
111. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 60 (Pa. 1839); Borrekins v. Bevan & Porter, 3
Rawle 22, 45 (Pa. 1831); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 68, at 511-12.
112. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 56 (Pa. 1839); Borrekins v. Bevan & Porter, 3
Rawle 22, 45 (Pa. 1831).
113. McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 58 (Pa. 1839); Borrekins v. Bevan & Porter, 3
Rawle 22, 43, 45-46 (Pa. 1831).
114. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 68, § 201, at 514-17.
115. Holmes v. Tyson, 147 Pa. 305, 306-07, 23 A. 564 (1892).
116. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 12.
11,7. 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 68, § 194, at 499.
118. Id. at 499-500. It also settled longstanding confusion resulting from the view that only
a promise could be a warranty while an affirmation or representation was merely evidence of
a warranty.
119. UNIFORM SALmE AcT § 76(1), provided:
"Buyer" means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods, or any legal successor in
interest of such person .....
"Seller" means a person who sells or agrees to sell goods, or any legal successor in
interest of such person.
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into the contract.' 0 One could assume that when the warrantor
made the representations respecting the goods, he made them only
with his buyer in mind. Such an analysis, however, would seem
unpersuasive in both horizontal and vertical privity contexts since
injury to a third party may be a foreseeable event.' 2 ' Moreover, when
the goods have been injected into the marketing chain by sale to a
merchant, such as the wholesaler, nothing is more foreseeable than
their resale to a consumer.
As far back as 1891, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke,'22 founded a warranty of quality inur-
ing to the benefit of a remote purchaser upon a tobacco sample tag
which made a specific representation that it was stripped and sam-
ple warranted. The court held that explanatory evidence and usage
of the trade were admissible to give meaning to the language on the
tag to establish the scope of the express warranty.' Whether this
specific representation situation may be viewed as an actual excep-
tion to the privity of warranty rule is inconsequential in light of the
established case law.
The specific or express representation rule seems to have devel-
oped in Pennsylvania along both the usage of trade theory of
Conestoga Cigar and the theory of public advertisement. Omitting
discussion of trade custom and horizontal privity, the Third Circuit
in Mannsz v. Mac Whyte,'24 recognized a right of action in the widow
of a purchaser of defective goods against both the supplier and the
manufacturer. In this diversity action, the Mannsz court purported
to apply Pennsylvania law to the widow's breach of warranty action.
The decedent purchased wire rope, supplied by one defendant and
manufactured by the other. A manual published by the
manufacturer was introduced into evidence, the contents of which
were held to constitute an express warranty. Finding that these
representations ran to the public, the court concluded that privity
need not be established.' 5 Although the court affirmed the lower
120. 1 S. WILLASTON, supra note 68, § 197, at 506-07.
121. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413-14, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100
(1960).
122. 144 Pa. 159, 22 A. 868 (1891).
123. The court held that the tag was a guaranty of the tobacco's quality at the time of
inspection and for six month's thereafter, for the benefit of any person into whose possession
the tobacco had come. Though the court interpreted the tag as a contract, the issue resolved
was the existence of a warranty. Id. at 172-73, 22 A. at 869.
124. 155 F.2d 445, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1946).
125. Id. at 449-51.
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court's conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
because of insufficient evidence of breach of warranty,' its pro-
nouncements with respect to privity and recognition of the third
party's right of action left their indelible mark:
We think it is clear that whether the approach to the prob-
lem be by way of warranty or under the doctrine of negligence,
the requirement of privity between the injured party and the
manufacturer of the article which has injured him has been
obliterated from the Pennsylvania law.'
Seven years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed to give
some support to the express representation rule, but nevertheless
distinguished Mannsz in a commercial case holding no warranty
could be established. 28
An analogous approach through which the plaintiff could find an
avenue of escape from the privity doctrine was through proof of the
manufacturer's advertising. This is the principle of "advertised-
126. The court found the representations in the manual constituted an express warranty
of the wire rope's tensile strength and intended uses. The decedent's use of the wire rope for
supporting a scaffolding was neither specified nor similar to those specified in the manual.
There was no breach of warranty. Id.
Since a breach of warranty action for personal injuries is sufficiently analogous to a negli-
gence action to recover for injuries inflicted by a defective product, the Mannsz court's
determination with respect to privity was entirely necessary for the proper determination of
the case. The negligence question of duty is the preliminary issue that must be considered
before the trier of fact can decide whether there has been a breach of the defendant's standard
of care with respect to the plaintiff. Likewise, the court's initial ruling with respect to the
widow's protected status was essential to a subsequent holding of nonliability for not proving
a breach of warranty.
127. Id. at 449-50.
128. Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953). In Silverman,
the plaintiff sued for breach of express warranty to recover for breakage of canning jars and
resulting damage to other jars. The defective jars were ordered from the defendant jobber who
sent the order to the sole sales agent of the manufacturer who shipped the jars directly to
the plaintiff. Failing to succeed on a principal-agent theory, the plaintiff sought to hold the
manufacturer's sole agent upon the Mannsz rationale for this commercial loss. The court held
that in all the cases cited by the plaintiff, the manufacturer had conveyed or intended to
convey some sort of representation of quality or fitness for particular use "by catalogue,
manual, tags affixed to shipment, legend upon container, or by negotiation with the subpur-
chaser." Id. at 428, 100 A.2d at 718. Hence, the defendant manufacturer's agent prevailed
on its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
The cruel twist of the case was that the plaintiff's verdict against the agent for $3220
damage was lost though the plaintiff's immediate seller succeeded in his action for the price
of $720 for the defective goods sold. The court dismissed the plaintiff's plea that the result
was a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 430-31, 100 A.2d at 719-20.
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product-liability" which had its genesis in Roberts v. Anheuser-
Busch Brewing Ass'n,'2 and attained national recognition in Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co. "I The advertising concept has equal applicability
in both express and implied warranty cases. Apparently, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has firmly established both prongs of the
Conestoga Cigar-Baxter concept with respect to vertical privity for
both implied and express warranty.'"' There seems to be little theo-
retical difficulty in extending the theory to "horizontal" plaintiffs,
beyond those enumerated in Code section 2-318, and those already
extended protection by the courts. "
129. 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912). The court found no contractual relation between
the injured plaintiff and the manufacturer of a health mixture. However, an action was
maintainable in tort for injuries resulting from the "medicine" if the plaintiff relied upon
representations made by the manufacturer through its advertisements. Id. at 451-52, 98 N.E.
at 96. As an historical note, the court cited many cases, including Thomas v. Winchester and
-Langridge v. Levy, for the following rule:
If the defendant made such representations as of its own knowledge, and put its
mixture upon the market to come through wholesale and retail dealers to the ultimate
consumers, who in reliance upon such representations bought and drank the mixture
in the manner intended by the defendant, these representations must be regarded as
continuous, intended to be accepted and relied on by all who finally should purchase
the article for their own consumption. This rule often has been declared.
Id. at 451, 98 N.E. at 96.
130. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd
on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). The Baxter court held that statements
made in Ford Motor Company catalogues and printed matter that the windshield was shat-
terproof were the basis for the manufacturer's liability without proof of negligence, scienter,
or privity of contract. After extensively quoting from Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,
135 P. 633 (1915) (a food case), the Baxter court held the trial court in error for excluding
Ford Motor Company's literature upon which the purchaser had a right to rely. 168 Wash.
at 463. 12 P.2d at 412.
131. Kassab v. Central Soya. 432 Pa. 217, 227-28, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968) "Nor is it
usually the merchant who advertises the product on such a large scale as to attract consum-
ers."; Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 616, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963) "Further,
in express warranties the purchaser or subpurchaser can rely thereon, for they are considered
a part of the consideration for the purchase and are meant to be relied upon by the pur-
chaser."
132. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The fact is that the dealer and the ordinary buyer do not, and are not expected to,
buy goods, whether they be foodstuffs or automobiles, exclusively for their own con-
sumption or use. Makers and manufacturers know this and advertise and market their
products on that assumption; witness, the "family" car, the baby foods, etc. . . .With
the advent of mass marketing, the manufacturer became remote from the purchaser,
sales were accomplished through intermediaries, and the demand for the product was
created by advertising media. In such an economy it becomes obvious that the con-
sumer was the person being cultivated. Manifestly, the connotation of "consumer" was
broader than that of "buyer." He signified such a person who, in the reasonable
contemplation of the parties to the sale, might be expected to use the product . ..
1974 Comment
As for express warranty, it may be stated that its principal devel-
opment in the area of products liability has been the liability of
manufacturers founded upon their express representations made in
newspaper, magazine, radio and television advertisements, package
labels and other disseminated literature.
Dean Prosser stated that more is required than mere "puffing"'
or sales talk, though general assertions of quality and safety, such
as those demonstrated and spoken by a television housewife wash-
ing dishes may be found by the jury to establish an express war-
ranty.' 34 Further requirements are the manufacturer's intention or
expectation that the representations will reach the plaintiff, and the
latter's reliance thereon, at least when he is using the product.' 35
Prosser, however, finds it unnecessary for a plaintiff to rely on the
representation when making the purchase. This view is consistent
with the Mannsz court's disavowance of any legal consequence flow-
Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 80-81 (Francis, J.).
In Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974), Justice Roberts stated
that "a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his product impliedly represents that it
is safe for its intended use." Id. at 907. The observations of these two eminent justices,
however, might not be extended to bystanders affected by the defective product's use since a
bystander by definition is not "such a person who, in the reasonable contemplation of the
parties to the sale might be expected to use the product," as was Mrs. Henningsen. 32 N.J.
at 379, 161 A.2d at 80. And, the manufacturer may not be impliedly representing the safety
of the product's intended use to an innocent bystander. 319 A.2d at 907. Nevertheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's inclination to find the Code's warranty protection and section
402A "co-extensive," id., should permit the courts to grant recovery to an innocent third party
who may reasonably be expected to be affected by the defective goods. The public policy has
demanded the compensation of one who is unable to protect himself from the manufacturer's
defective product. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. at 230 n.6, 246 A.2d at 856 n.6.
133. Simplex commendatio non obligat: Mere recommendation does not bind; see 1 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 68, § 202, at 517-18.
134. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 14, at 836-37.
135. Id. at 835-38. Though one need not rely upon the seller's representations at the time
of purchase, there must be reasonable reliance at the time of the product's use for the injured
purchaser or consumer to recover for breach of express warranty.
Whether the "reliance" concept has been retained by the Code has been the subject of
much speculation. Most of the speculation has centered around the meaning of "basis of the
bargain" which § 2-314 has made the conceptual nexus that transforms statements into
warranties. The comments to § 2-314 declare that "no particular reliance" is necessary to
make particular affirmations of fact part of the basis of the bargain.
White and Summers rise above the confusion surrounding the concept of "basis of the
bargain" to declare it a rebuttable presumption of reliance. J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 277-79 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SuMMERs].
White and Summers ask: "Can an advertisement form the basis of the bargain?" They
conclude that though an advertisement can be a part of the "basis of the bargain," Comment
3 requires affirmations of fact to be made "during a bargain." Hence, the plaintiff's burden
would include proof of reliance when making the purchase. Id. at 279-80.
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ing from the plaintiffs failure to prove reliance when the decedent
purchased the wire rope. However, it would seem that lack of proof
of the decedent's knowledge of the contents of the manual which
created the express warranty brought the case close to the limit of
recovery allowable under section 402A.131 As stated above, no breach
of warranty could be found in Mannsz, and rightfully so. The man-
ual which the decedent failed to read listed the intended uses for
the wire rope. Neither those nor analogous uses included the suspen-
sion of the heavy load for scaffolding which the decedent had con-
structed. Hence, while the court reached a correct result, its deci-
sion was awkwardly founded upon negligence and non-privity
breach of warranty cases." 7
The superior court was the first Pennsylvania court to recognize
the advertising concept of express representation. It stated the prop-
osition that a manufacturer who by means of advertising extols his
product in an effort to persuade the public to buy, may be liable for
damages to the ultimate purchaser notwithstanding the total
absence of privity. 135 In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,' 38' the plaintiffs,
who were engaged in a trucking business, brought an action for
breach of implied warranty of fitness for recovery of the value of a
destroyed trailer and the cost of repairing the tractor. The tractor
had been driven for a month and a half and 3000 miles when the
steering mechanism failed, resulting in the above mentioned dam-
age. Though this short period of use fell within the "Ford Motor
Company Warranty" limiting the purchaser to replacement parts,
the court held the express warranty non-exclusive. 3 ' Not bound by
the restrictions of the express warranty, the court held that there
existed an implied warranty of merchantability, and on this basis
found for the plaintiff.
Two principles of importance emerged from the Jarnot decision.
136. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 1946); cf Jacobs v. Technical
Chemical Co., 472 S.W.2d 191, 198-99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971), rev'd, 480 S.W.2d 602, 605-06
(Tex. 1972). Query whether a plaintiff can recover under section 402A due to a product
defective by reason of lack of warning if the plaintiff admits he would have disregarded the
warning had it been attached to the product?
137. 155 F.2d at 450.
138. Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 429-30, 156 A.2d 568, 572 (1959).
138.1. Id.
139. Id. at 428-29, 156 A.2d at 571-72. Applying exclusively to repairs and replacement,
the court held that since "Ford Motor Company Warranty" was not accepted expressly in
lieu of all other warranties, an implied warranty of merchantability was not negated. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316 to -317.
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First, although not necessary to the decision, the court announced
the "principle of advertised-product-liability" through which a
court would be allowed to take notice of national advertising not
appearing in the record. 4' Second, the court based its decision upon
the naked statement that no privity need be shown in cases involv-
ing breach of implied warranties. Such a broad statement was not,
however, supported by the cases upon which it claimed reliance:
Loch v. Confairl" merely held a warranty theory inapplicable where
there had been no sale or contract of sale; Silverman was later
deemed a perplexing reference;' the cases of Conestoga Cigar and
Mannsz dealt with express warranties; and Knapp v. Willys-
Ardmore, Inc."' was a factually similar, but nonprivity, case.",
EROSION OF THE PRIVITY DOCTRINE-IMPLIED WARRANTY
Until the Code's adoption, privity was generally a necessary but
withering requirement of a breach of implied warranty action under
the Uniform Sales Act. Intended as a codification of the common
law, though it may to some extent have weakened the foundation
of caveat emptor, "5 the Uniform Sales Act spoke in terms of the
warranty obligations of the "seller" and the "buyer."'" The extent
to which the manufacturer or retailer was held to have made an
implied warranty was narrowed to rather specific instances. The
Uniform Sales Act provided for, inter alia: (1) implied warranties
in sale by description or sample (more properly be called express
warranties since they were based on the descriptive language of the
parties) which tended to overlap the treatment of the implied war-
ranty of merchantable quality; and (2) implied warranties of mer-
140. 191 Pa. Super, at 430, 156 A.2d at 572.
141. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
142. Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953); see Annot.,
75 A.L.R.2d 39, 54 (1961). The annotation writer was perplexed by the Jarnot court's reference
to Silverman, since he considered the latter court's reference to Mannsz an exception to the
general privity doctrine.
143. 174 Pa. Super. 90, 100 A.2d 105 (1953).
144. Nevertheless, Prosser deemed the Jarnot decision one of the "seven spectacular
decisions" which discarded the limitations of the warranty approach which traditionally
allowed recovery only where the product was food, beverage or goods for intimate bodily use
and the plaintiff was in privity with the defendant. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at
1113.
145. 1 S. WLISTON, supra note 68, § 227, at 583.
146. See note 119 supra.
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chantable quality and fitness for particular use, which are the sub-
jects of the privity problem considered below."7
The Uniform Sales Act was restrictive in its approach for it pro-
vided that there was no implied warranty as to the quality or fitness
for a particular purpose except as prescribed in the Act. Since these
two warranties specifically refer only to the immediate buyer and
seller, and since the Act by its terms renders them exclusive
remedies, the privity wall was constructed to reach new heights. 45
The purchaser, without the aid of an established exception, could
not proceed vertically up the marketing chain nor was protection
provided horizontally to those who could have reasonably been ex-
pected to suffer injury due to the defective product.
Some have viewed the Uniform Sales Act as extending and liber-
alizing the common law of sales so as to soften the punch of the
doctrine of caveat emptor."5 Others have characterized it as restric-
tive, pointing to the ease of disclaimer, and the requirements of
proof of reliance and prompt notice. 50 The implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose were imposed
as a matter of law.'5 ' As the manufacturer withdrew from direct
sales to the consumer, the imposition of implied warranties only
upon the last retailer undoubtedly produced harsh results. A strug-
gling merchant or an effectively shielded manufacturer (by reason
of disclaimers and limitations of remedies) provided the injured
party with little solace. In the area of implied warranties, where the
law, not the parties, imposes the legal obligations, the barrier of
privity did not seem justified. Hence, early in the reign of the doc-
trine, judicial ingenuity developed techniques to escape the confines
of privity in those cases where the courts recognized that the dealer
and the buyer did not necessarily buy the manufacturer's. goods for
their own exclusive use or consumption.
Remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to de-
pend upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation of
147. UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 14, 15, 16. See also Peerless Elec. Co. v. Call, 82 Pa. Super.
550 (1924); 1 S. WILUSTON, supra note 68, § 223.
148. Donovan, supra note 7, at 193-94 & n.61.
149. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 371-72, 161 A.2d 69, 76-77
(1960).
150. Donovan, supra note 7, at 196-97; Jaeger, supra note 87, at 39-47.
151. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916);
Ebbert v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 330 Pa. 257, 269, 198 A. 323, 329 (1938); A. CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS § 773 (1952) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
Vol. 13: 53
Comment
the manufacturer should not be based alone on privity of con-
tract. It should rest, as was once said, upon "the demands of
social justice."'52
By far the greatest success in the consumer's battle with the priv-
ity defense was in the field of food and beverages. As early as 1266,
those engaged in selling food were held to a high degree of responsi-
bility.' -3 By virtue of this special obligation, an 1875 Pennsylvania
case, as well as a great number of other nineteenth century cases in
America, sustained an action for breach of warranty imposing strict
liability upon the seller and manufacturer of the food.'54 Prosser
observed that the protection of subpurchasers and third parties
came as "the aftermath of a prolonged and violent national agita-
tion over defective foods, which at times almost reached a pitch of
hysteria.' ' 5  Pennsylvania enacted a statute in 1889 which embod-
ied the common law rule that the seller of articles of food for imme-
diate human consumption owed a duty to sell food which was whole-
some and fit for eating.' The supreme court in Catani v. Swift &
Co.,"' was an early leader in abolishing the requirement of vertical
privity in cases of warranty of fitness of food stuffs. Supported by
the fact that the pork in Catani and the Coca Cola in Nock v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works'-" were sold in the original packages, the courts
were able to conclude that the manufacturer represented the whole-
someness and suitability of the contents and the consumer had a
right to rely upon such representations. These two decisions were
founded upon the food statute of 1889,1'1 but more fundamentally,
upon notions of "social justice," which precluded the operation of
the doctrine of privity. The force of caveat emptor had been decid-
edly repelled and a cause of action for breach of implied warranty
without privity was created. 60 The logical extension of this doctrine
beyond food and beverages was to be anticipated.
152. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 626-27, 135 P. 633, 635 (1913).
153. Section 402A, Comment b.
154. McNaughton v. Joy, 1 Week. N. of Cas. 470 (C.P. Pa. 1875) (plaintiff prevailed on
an averment of "a very inferior quality" of foodstuffs to sustain an action in assumpsit
apparently for property damage); Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1104 n.37.
155. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 14, at 1104-05.
156. Law of May 4, 1889, No. 84 [1889] Pa. Laws 87 (repealed 1943).
157. 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915).
158. 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
159. Law of May 4, 1889, No. 84 [1889] Pa. Laws 87 (repealed 1943).
160. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 614-15, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963);
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In Pennsylvania, as well as other jurisdictions, there were progres-
sive steps from foodstuffs, to products intended for intimate bodily
use, such as cosmetics,'' drugs,6 2 cigarettes,63 clothing,6 ' and then
to a wide variety of products' 5 upon which an implied warranty
could be founded to protect the consumer sans privity. Jarnot and
Mannsz appeared to conclude this logical sequence by which the
doctrine had crumbled in Pennsylvania.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318-EROSION OF THE PRIVITY
DOCTRINE?
In 1953, Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Commercial Code"6
which codified the sales law warranties. Express warranties were
made to rest upon "dickered" aspects of the contract and implied
warranties made to arise from the factual situation." 7 Product-
related personal injuries may be redressed upon breaches of express
warranties arising from an affirmation of fact or promise, descrip-
tion of the goods, or sample or model which is made part of the
"basis of the bargain;"'6 8 implied warranties of merchantability; 9
and implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. 70 These
warranties are extended beyond the immediate purchaser of the
product "to any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is the guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.' 7' These third
party beneficiaries are treated as if they are the immediate purchas-
ers of the defective goods. 7 1
Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 57, 95 A. 931, 932 (1915), "Public policy regards the public
good . . .so as to promote the public welfare by holding producers and manufacturers to a
duty to consumers to guard against diseased and poisonous meats. ; Jacob E. Decker
& Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
161. E.g., Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
162. Cf., e.g., Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A.2d 743 (1942).
163. See Jaeger, supra note 87, at 93-96; Prosser, The Fall, supra note 14, at 812-14.
164. E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962).
165. See Jaeger, supra note 87, at 110-36.
166. Act of April 6, 1953, No. 1, [1953] Pa. Laws 3, as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
1-101 et seq. (1970).
167. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 1.
168. Id. § 2-313.
169. Id. § 2-314.
170. Id. § 2-315.
171. Id. § 2-318.
172. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 390, 221 A.2d 320, 324 (1966). In his concurring and
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The question arises: Does Code section 2-318 contract or expand
the prior sales law? This is merely a determination of the status of
the privity doctrine at the time of the Code's adoption. The heart
of the controversy is really whether Code section 2-318 mandates the
contraction or expansion of the prior sales law.
Section 2-318 is without a statutory predecessor' and its position
in the Code "appears more as an afterthought than as a capstone
of the Code's coverage of warranties."'' Code section 2-318 was
founded upon the tort concept of foreseeability and upon the more
persuasive approaches which the courts had previously utilized to
nullify the privity defense in a particular case. Agency principles,'
dissenting opinion, Justice Jones quoted Speidel, supra note 17, at 815, for the proposition
that the specifically enumerated third party beneficiaries in section 2-318 can enforce the
express or implied warranties against, at the very least, the seller "as if they were the immedi-
ate purchasers." 422 Pa. at 404, 221 A.2d at 331. This interpretation is wholly consistent with
the drafters' intentions as evidenced by section 2-318, Comment 2, which provides in perti-
nent part:
2. The purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family, household and guests the
benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of sale, thereby
freeing any such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to "privity." ... Implicit
in the section is that any beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action for breach
of warranty against the seller whose warranty extends to him.
173. McNulty, Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Third Party
Beneficiaries of Warranties is Alive and Well and Living in Illinois, 51 CHI. B. REc. 339, 340
(1970) [hereinafter cited as McNulty]. Section 2-318 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE was
originally derived from the unenacted UNIFORM REVISED SALES Acr § 43, which evidently was
not the subject of the compromise decisions which led to the restricted and enacted section
2-318. UNIFORM REVISED SALES AT, § 43 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944) provided:
A warranty extends to any natural person whose relationship to the buyer is such as
to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person or property by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Though no prior uniform statute can be found, a few individual jurisdictions had made
previous legislative inroads on the concept of privity of warranty. See N.Y. LAW REvISION
COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 413 (1955).
174. NcNulty, supra note 173, at 340.
175. Principally in food cases, the nonpurchasing injured plaintiff could have recovered
if it could have been presumed or shown that the purchaser acted as the plaintiff's agent.
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961) (parents agent
for infant); Mouren v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 1 N.Y.2d 884, 136 N.E.2d 715, 154 N.Y.S.2d
642 (1956) (husband agent for wife); Bowman v. Great At. & Pac, Tea Co., 308 N.Y. 780,
125 N.E.2d 165 (1955) (one sister agent for another when purchasing with common funds);
Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931) (wife agent for
husband). However, as could be expected, considerable confusion, conflicting results and
injustice surrounded the application of this principle. Comment, On the Problem of Exten.-
sion of Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 CONN. L. REv. 369, 372 & n.16
(1968).
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the logical fiction of a warranty running with the goods, 7 ' the as-
signment theory,'77 and the third party berieficiary doctrine'78 were
effective judicial responses to the unjust results that follow from the
application of the privity defense. These approaches and the various
other legal subterfuges, through which the courts undertook to com-
pensate the injured party when justice demanded, led to considera-
ble uncertainty for the plaintiff. Consequently, the drafters of the
Code proposed section 2-318. Its third party beneficiary theory, 7'
combined with the concept of foreseeability, is the written expres-
sion of a legislative recognition of consumer vulnerability and the
realities of the manufacturing, marketing and financing system
which bring the product into use and consumption.
Section 2-318 does not utilize the essence of the common law third
party beneficiary doctrine, the "intent to benefit" test. Rather, the
section transcends the doctrine, extending protection to consumers
where limitations of the common law test would fail him. 180 An
analysis of third party beneficiary doctrine requires an understand-
ing of the contract in question and the relationship of the parties to
it. In any sales contract, as between the manufacturer and the re-
tailer, the purchaser is a third party; as between the retailer and
purchaser, all other persons are third parties. In the case of express
warranties, the above third parties would acquire rights against the
manufacturer or retailer, respectively, only to the extent that the
retailer or purchaser intended some benefit to run to a third party
by virtue of the sale.' Yet, it strains the doctrine to its limits to
contend that such an intent is present in either the manufacturer-
retailer, or retailer-purchaser contracts. In the former situation the
manufacturer's only motivation is "his desire for the consideration
given by the promisee,"'' 2 while the retailer only seeks the acquisi-
tion of the manufacturer's products for resale. Similarly in the latter
176. This fiction had its genesis in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111
So. 305 (1927), which drew an analogy to covenants running with the land.
177. Williston favored an "assignment" theory by which both express and implied war-
ranties would be given to the assignee/subpurchaser who in turn would have the power to
enforce the assignor's rights against the manufacturer. 1 S. WnLISTON, supra note 68, § 244.
178. Id. § 244(a).
179. The term is used in section 2-318's caption which is made part of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE by section 1-109.
180. 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 347 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959).
181. CORBIN, supra note 151, § 775.
182. Id. § 776. The various state and federal food, drug, cosmetic and other product safety
regulations have modified, but not precluded this rationale.
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situation, it is difficult to see how the retailer intends to benefit
the purchaser's family and innocent bystanders. 8 3 Unless this
strained application were accepted to establish the requisite priv-
ity,111 recovery by the third party would be barred. To overcome
these conceptual gymnastics, compelled by a desire to protect third
persons, section 2-318 was enacted.
Section 2-318 is also helpful in overcoming the even greater con-
ceptual hurdles presented by an attempt to apply the "intent to
benefit" test to implied warranties. Since such warranties create
rights by law and not by contractual terms, the intention of the
contracting parties is irrelevant to the creation of rights and liabili-
ties. Thus any attempt to assert rights by a third party based upon
a purported intention of the parties would seem difficult to sustain.
From this viewpoint, Code section 2-318 is appropriately labeled
"Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied." The
drafters have acknowledged the doctrine's force and, in response to
the needs of the consuming public and its fictitious nature in im-
plied warranty situations, have appropriately substituted the con-
cept of foreseeability and representative classes for the common law
"intention to benefit" test.
Considerable controversy has ensued over the scope of the section
because of the ambiguity raised by the comments as to whether the
Code's protection was to extend solely to the specifically enumer-
ated beneficiaries.'5 Such controversy raised the issue of the court's
own power to expand or contract the existing law-whether section
2-318 can or must change the existing state privity doctrine?
Code section 2-318's inclusion of all products within its scope was
clearly consistent with evolving Pennsylvania case law.' 6 Its expan-
sion of horizontal privity, though later criticized as confining,"7 was
183. With regard to the benefit to the innocent bystander, see the excellent discussion in
Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 916, 924-27 (1964).
184. La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 57, 295 N.W. 304, 307(1940).
185. McNulty, supra note 173, at 341. Comment 2 limits the Code's warranty protection
to those specifically enumerated in section 2-318 while Comment 3 indicates that the section's
enumeration is not all-inclusive. Comment 3 "in a cryptic role of neutrality, pointed to the
way for the addition of other beneficiaries by judicial determination." Id. Thus, the conflict
between the section and its comment "made controversy inevitable from the outset." Id.
186. A general review of the negligence law in this area should lead one to this conclusion.
See Mannsz v. MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa.
Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
187. The holdings in Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961), Mannsz,
and Jarnot seemed to have established Pennsylvania as a no-privity state. This would have
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at the time of the Code's enactment likewise in harmony with the
trend in that direction. "' For example, a cause of action had already
been established in a family member if the purchaser was acting as
an agent for the injured party. 9 However, its restrictive treatment
in terms of vertical privity did not comport with Pennsylvania's
abrogation of the doctrine in certain instances. 9 °
After the enactment of section 2-318, it became necessary for the
courts to determine whether the listing of beneficiaries was intended
to be exclusive or merely suggestive. This in turn would determine
the courts' latitude in expanding horizontal privity to encompass
those not specifically enumerated. The comments are ambiguous
at best. Comment 2 states the purpose of the section: to give the
enumerated beneficiaries the purchaser's warranties and thus free
them from the technical privity rules. 9' This clarity is short-lived,
for Comment 3 expresses the Code's neutrality beyond these benefi-
ciaries: "Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's
warranties . . .extend to other persons .. ."I" This deference to
the "developing case law" up to the early 1960's would appear to
have incorporated into Pennsylvania law the erosion of the defense
of lack of privity. Such erosion had been evident in Mannsz, Jarnot
and Thompson v. Reedman93 which used the food, beverage and
intimate bodily use cases as precedent for the conclusion that the
been Jaeger's conclusion had the Hochgertel case not come down while his article was in page
proofs. For the development of the Pennsylvania law see Jaeger, supra note 87, at 4-31;
accord, Simpson v. Powered Prod., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555, (1963).
188. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Notes to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1970). But see
Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961), where the court quoted section 2-
318 and Comment 3 and concluded:
It is too much of a leap, it seems, to classify a guest passenger in an automobile as a
guest in the home. In that light, the question remains one of gleaning the rule from
the "developing case law."
Id. at 121. After a discussion of the Pennsylvania warranty cases, the court concluded that
the privity defense was and remained "obliterated" as the Mannsz court had declared fifteen
years before. Id. at 124.
189. E.g., Young v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (wife
agent for husband but not daughter for purchase of preserves containing a dead mouse); see
note 175 supra.
190. Ezer, supra note 83, at 326. Mannsz and Jarnot were breach of warranty actions
brought against the manufacturer.
191. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 2.
192. Id. Comment 3.




law of Pennsylvania was in tune with the national trend away from
privity of warranty to foreseeability.
Further, it remained to be determined whether the notable omis-
sion of any treatment of vertical privity in a section dealing with
privity reform constituted a legislative bar to expansion in that
area. More specifically, one must ask: Towards what was this lan-
guage directed-vertical privity (those in the distributive chain);
horizontal privity (those in more remote relation than the pur-
chaser's family, household and guests); or combined aspects of the
two? The drafters probably intended the third proposition since the
delineation of vertical and horizontal privity as a judicial aid to the
decision-making process (as opposed to merely descriptive terminol-
ogy) was developed subsequent to the adoption of the official draft
of Code section 2-318 and its comments in 1952 by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissions on Uni-
form State Laws.
It appears that in their attempt to codify the various approaches
the courts had taken to circumvent the defense of privity, the draf-
ters inadvertently succeeded in reactivating the doctrine." 4 Al-
though section 2-318 expressly invalidated the great bulk of the
horizontal privity situations,'95 some have suggested that it stifled
further development in this area,'96 interpreting its language as an
indication of legislative intent to limit warranty protection exclu-
sively to the enumerated beneficiaries. 97 It can be persuasively
argued that Comment 3 is without legislative force and that the
extension of warranties to the designated beneficiaries is a limita-
tion upon the classes of persons entitled to such protection. "Fur-
ther, it is not for [the court] to legislate or by interpretation to add
to legislation, matters which the legislature saw fit not to in-
clude."' " This view was initially adopted by the Pennsylvania Su-
194. Rapson, Products Liability Under and Beyond the U C. C., 2 U.C.C.L.J. 315, 316, 325
(1970).
195. Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability - With a Close Look at Section 402A
and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 449 (1969).
196. Ezer, supra note 83, at 327.
197. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 613-14, 187 A.2d 575, 577 (1963) (the
legislature included the specifically enumerated beneficiaries to the exclusion of all other
potential "horizontal" plaintiffs). See Henry v. Eshelman, 99 R.° 518, 209 A.2d 46 (1965);
Comment, U. C. C. Section 2-318: Effect on Washington Requirements of Privity in Products
Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. REv. 253, 258 (1966).
198. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 614, 187 A.2d 575, 577 (1963). The
court quoted section 2-318 and Comments 2 and 3. It then stated that the plaintiff employee
1974
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preme Court which held that the limiting of the Code's warranties
to the buyer, his family, household or houseguests impliedly prohib-
ited warranty recovery, horizontally, to those not enumerated;'99
and vertically, even to those that were.2 ® Other commentators"' and
state comments,2 2 however, have identified this section as expressly
dealing with horizontal privity only, leaving vertical privity to the
developing case law, and have recognized the drafters' intention to
leave unrestricted the number of potential plaintiffs. 20
To understand such holdings, a quick review of section 2-318's
history is helpful. The section's original approach was less restric-
tive. The Proposed Final Draft extended warranty protection along
foreseeability lines to the designated beneficiaries "or one whose
relationship to [the buyer] is such as to make it reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods." 14 Section 2-718 of the Proposed Final Draft allowed the last
was not in the protected categories and that it is not for the court to legislate that which the
general assembly had not included. Id. at 612-14, 187 A.2d at 577. Citing Comment 3, the
Hochgertel court found "the Code was not intended to restrict the case law in this field
. .. The court embarked upon a review of the Pennsylvania law in the vertical privity
area and concluded that the employee was a "complete stranger" to the sales transaction and
no case had extended warranty protection "beyond a purchaser in the distributive chain."
Id. at 614-15, 187 A.2d at 578 (emphasis added); accord, Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 394-
98, 221 A.2d 320, 326-28 (1966) (Bell, C.J., concurring).
199. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) (denied recovery
to an employee).
200. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
201. WHrrE & SuMMERS, supra note 135, at 327; Murray, supra note 7, at 397.
202. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney 1964) (The annotations following this section state
"the Code enlarges the number of prospective plaintiffs in a warranty action but does not
increase the number of potential defendants.").
203. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2 provides, in pertinent part:
The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party beneficiaries expressly recognize this
case law development within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to
the case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful guidance
in dealing with further cases as they arise.
204. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950) provided:
A warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of.the buyer or who is his guest or one whose relationship to him
is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Id. The comments pertinent to this language provided:
2. This section, following the dominant trend of judicial opinion developed in the
light of modern distribution methods and the fact of group consumption, is intended
to broaden the right and the remedy of the consumer in warranty, to free them from
any technical rules as to "privity" and to make them, insofar as feasible, directly
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reseller to implead his seller, and section 2-719 provided for a direct
action against a prior seller subject to impleader. Since the 1952
version eliminated the broad horizontal language and the impleader
and direct action provisions, it was reasonalble to contend that the
drafters intended to limit the warranty protection to those specified
therein. Such a position, though supportable, was certainly not
infallible. The problem with section 2-318 was that it attempted to
codify the uncodifable.2 05 This would explain the section's present
three official 06 and various state legislative alternatives 7 and judi-
cial interpretations. 20 8
enforceable against the party ultimately responsible for any injury.
3. This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family,
household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the basic test as to the extension
of the seller's warranties to third parties is whether the person injured was in such a
relationship to the buyer as could reasonably be expected to result in his use, handling
or consumption of the goods in ordinary course, or was in the type of relationship which
could reasonably be expected to result in his being affected by the breach of warranty.
Thus, trespassers are not covered by the present section since their use is not in the
ordinary course. On the other hand, employees of an industrial consumer are covered
and the policy of this Article intends that neither the privity concept, nor any gaps in
Workmen's Compensation Acts, nor any technical construction of 'employment' shall
defeat adequate protection under this section.
4. This Article is intended to take the burden of defending cases from an intermedi-
ate seller by permitting him to implead his own seller and by providing, at the choice
of the consumer, a direct action against the party ultimately responsible for the injury.
Id.
205. There was no thought that this section (2-318) was to set the maximum bound-
aries for the group of third parties who could recover when injured by defective goods.
The Code had set the minimum coverage ....
R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 280 (1970).
206. In 1966, the section was amended to include three alternatives designed to fit the
individual state's already developed case law. Alternative A is the original 1952 version of
section 2-318.
Alternative B expands the class of beneficiaries to the full foreseeability scope:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.
Alternative C not only encompasses all foreseeable injured persons, but it follows the
modern trend and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, by extending the rule to all
injuries:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exlude or limit the operation of this section
with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
207. Nineteen states have adopted "variations" from the Alternative A approach. R.
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 728-30 (1970); Id. at 497-98 (Supp. 1973).
208. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 6:67-117, at 689-739 (R. Hursh ed. 1961);
Id. §§ 6:68-115, at 474-502 (Supp. 1973).
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The 1952 Final Draft added the word "seller's" before "warranty"
and Comment 2 remarked that the section "rests primarily upon the
merchant seller's warranty. '" '09 While this language may be read as
indicating a restriction upon the choice of defendants to the last
reseller,10 some have argued that the Code intended to adopt a
policy of vertical neutrality."' Indeed, Comment 3 supports this
latter proposition in providing: "Beyond this, the section is neutral
. . .on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."' ' It is
submitted that, as a matter of policy,"' the "seller" in section 2-318
may be used conceptually in the same manner as it is interpreted
in the Restatment (Second) of Torts, Section 402A.2 "
VERTICAL PRIVITY-RECENT PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
TREATMENT
Recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court treatment of vertical privity
can be found in the horizontal privity case of Hochgertel v. Canada
Dry Corp. ,215 the horizontal and vertical privity case of Miller v.
Preitz,216 and the vertical privity case of Kassab v. Central Soya.', 7
It should be noted that in the foregoing discussion the distinction
drawn between vertical and horizontal privity was not expressly
recognized by the court until Kassab. It is suggested, however, that
only by such a conceptual delineation, even where the courts have
failed to do'so, can a true understanding of the subsequent develop-
ment of the vertical and horizontal distinction be understood.
As will be discussed in the following section, the Hochgertel fact
situation solely raised the issue of horizontal privity: Can an em-
209. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 2.
210. "A seller's warranty ... extends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of his buyer .... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (emphasis added).
211. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2, notes that the express warranty
section is limited to the warranties made by the seller to the buyer as a part of a contract for
sale. However, the drafters intended to leave undisturbed the "case law growth" in this area.
Donovan, supra note 7, at 220.
212. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3 (emphasis added).
213. See note 234 infra.
214. "One who sells" applies to all sellers from the manufacturer to the last reseller and
to nonsale situations. Donovan, supra note 7, at 233-38.
215. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
216. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
217. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
Vol. 13: 53
Comment
ployee recover for personal injuries under a breach of warranty
theory against one who sold goods to the plaintiffs employer? De-
spite the "horizontal" nature of the issue, the court, in attempted
compliance with the suggestion in Comment 3 to follow the "devel-
oping case law," restated the law with respect to vertical privity.
The court found vertical privity to be the established rule and cases
involving foodstuffs to be mere exceptions, without stating whether
these cases were indicative of a growing trend away from the rule.
In the case of goods for human consumption, the constraints of
privity were relaxed only with respect to subpurchasers 1 1 Despite
the fact that the issue theoretically called for a horizontal privity
analysis, the court ignored such analysis and applied the aforemen-
tioned "vertical" rules, denying recovery on the basis that the war-
ranty in question did not extend "beyond a purchaser in the distrib-
utive chain." '
Three years later, the supreme court in Miller extensively quoted
the Hochgertel vertical privity findings"' as precedent for what has
been referred to as "excruciating judicial torsion."22' Miller, decided
the same day that section 402A was adopted to grant recovery to, a
similarly situated plaintiff, 2 clung to the strictures of privity in
anomalously denying recovery to the party before it.Y Prior to that
day, the abrogation of the requirement of privity in a breach of
warranty action would, in essence, have resulted in the creation of
strict liability,"' thus making recovery in a personal injury action
depend upon whether the suit were brought in trespass for negli-
gence or in assumpsit for breach of warranty.2 25 With the adoption
218. 409 Pa. at 613-15, 187 A.2d 577-79.
219. Id. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578 (court's emphasis).
220. 422 Pa. at 391-92, 221 A.2d at 324-25, quoting 409 Pa. at 614-16, 187 A.2d at 578.
221. Bailey, Sales Warranties, Products Liability and the U.C.C.: A Lab Analysis of the
Cases, 4 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 291, 318 (1967).
222. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
223. Since the breach of warranty and strict liability actions are based on identical policy
considerations, the prevention of the Miller plaintiff from recovering while permitting the
Webb plaintiff to recover under identical facts was an anomalous and unjust result. Kassab
v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 230-31 n.6, 246 A.2d 848, 854 n.6.
224. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 393, 221 A.2d 320, 325 (1966). Liability under section
402A "is hardly more than what exists under implied warranty when stripped of the contract
doctrines of privity, disclaimer, requirements of notice of defect, and limitation through
inconsistencies with express warranties." Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429
(N.D. Ind. 1965).
225. As Justice Roberts indicated in his concurring and dissenting opinion, the majority
agreed with the policy behind section 402A, but since the action was brought in assumpsit,
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of 402A, however, this major roadblock to the abrogation of priv-
ity-disparate remedies with disparate burdens of proof'1-was no
longer a matter of legitimate concern.
The question of election of remedies, which had been repeatedly
answered in dissimilar fashions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justices, was finally settled in Kassab. The subjection of such in-
jured plaintiffs as Hochgertel and Miller's administrator to the vi-
cissitudes of proving the defendant's negligent conduct was an un-
fortunate consequence of unjustifiable judicial restraint, especially
in light of an existing trend to the contrary.
In Miller, the infant decedent's aunt purchased a vaporizer-
humidifier which shot boiling water onto the decedent's body caus-
ing his death. The product was purchased from a pharmacy owned
by the defendant Preitz, distributed by the defendant Rexall Drug
Company, and manufactured by the defendant Northern Electric
Company. Because the administrator brought an action for breach
of warranty, an action in assumpsit, the court would not allow re-
covery for wrongful death, an action in tort, but did sustain the
warranty action under the survival statute.12
The court, per Justice Cohen, first discussed the horizontal priv-
ity issue, quoting section 2-318 and Comments 2 and 3. Though not
delving into the perplexities of Comment 3, it found the decedent
nephew within the "family" of the purchaser. As a result, the ad-
ministrator was permitted to pursue his cause of action against the
retailer pharmacy. This enabled the court to inquire whether those
designated in Code section 2-318 could maintain an action against
the Miller case would not be the proper one in which to adopt the section 402A trespass form
of action. Justice Roberts suggested that the majority's reluctance "stems from a desire to
maintain doctrinal purity and to compel adherence to strict forms of pleading." Miller v.
Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 415, 221 A.2d 320, 336 (1966).
226. Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 276-77, 199 A.2d 463, 465 (1964) (Eagen,
J., dissenting); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 616, 187 A.2d 575, 579 (1963).
227. 422 Pa. at 385-87; 221 A.2d at 322. Under the Wrongful Death statute, the actionable
wrong is "death . . . occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence .... " PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1601 (1953). Hence, an action in assumpsit for breach of warranty is considered
inappropriate. But under the survival statute, the decedent's cause of action survives him
and may be brought by his personal representative "as though the decedent were alive." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3371, 3373 (Supp. 1974). Since the true nature of a breach of warranty
action to recover for personal injuries caused by a defective product is in tort, the court's
holding with respect to the different treatment accorded this statute is mere adherence to
the strict forms of pleading. See DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 586,
208 A.2d 283, 286 (1965) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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remote sellers. Citing the vertical privity passage from the
Hochgertel court, the court concluded:
In light of the discussion and holding of Hochgertel it seems
plain that under the developing case law decedent was not
within the benefits of any implied warranties made by the
remote sellers. This necessarily follows from the fact that he
was not a purchaser."'
Professor Murray finds this conclusion incredible12 The Miller
court laboriously arrived at the finding that the decedent was a
member of the purchaser's family. Despite its prior finding of hori-
zontal privity, the court seemed to base its failure to find vertical
privity on an absence of horizontal privity!2 30
The court's opinion is rather confused. In his conclusion, quoted
above, Justice Cohen refers to the decedent's nonpurchaser status
to find that he could not benefit from an implied warranty because
of lack of vertical privity. Such discussion, however, is couched in
terms of horizontal privity which he had already found to exist.
Further, the Hochgertel holding, which the Miller court relied on,
dealt only with the horizontal privity doctrine . ' Hence, the Miller
finding of lack of vertical privity was based upon a case which had
not dealt with that concept. To compound matters, immediately
following its "not-a-purchaser" conclusion, the Miller court stated:
"Even if he were a 'purchaser' the product involved would not bring
him within the rule that a 'purchaser' can sue a remote seller only
in cases involving 'food, beverages, and like goods for human con-
sumption.' "22 The court's basis for such a restriction upon the type
of product undoubtedly came from prior privity decisions in the area
of foodstuffs. However, section 2-318 was and is susceptible of only
one interpretation - it applies to all goods.
In their separate opinions in which they dissented from holding
remote sellers not liable in nonfood cases, Justice (later Chief Jus-
tice) Jones considered the requirement of vertical privity illogical,
while Justice Roberts opined that it elevated form over substance.
Both preferred the approach offered by section 402A in product-
related personal injury actions. Resolution of these varying views
228. 422 Pa. 392, 221 A.2d at 324-25.
229. Murray, supra note 7, at 404.
230. Id. at 405.
231. 422 Pa. at 392, 221 A.2d at 324-25, quoting 409 Pa. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578.
232. 422 Pa. at 392, 221 A.2d at 325.
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respecting vertical privity came shortly in Justice Roberts' majority
opinion in Kassab.211 The plaintiff-appellants were cattle breeders
who ordered cattle feed from defendant Pritts. In accordance with
a formula provided by the plaintiffs, Pritts blended various ingredi-
ents which included "Cattle Blend" manufactured by defendant
Central Soya. Shortly after the mixture was fed to the plaintiff's
herd, cows "began to abort and the breed bull began behaving in a
manner which tended to cast doubt upon his masculinity" - a
rather distressing predicament for the owners of a herd of breed
cattle. A chemical analysis revealed that the "Cattle Blend" con-
tained stilbestrol, a synthetic hormone which is added to the feed
of beef cattle to make them gain weight. Stilbestrol is not recom-
mended for breed cattle since it accentuates female characteristics,
including heat and abortions in cows and sterility in bulls. The trial
court found as a fact that the feed contained stilbestrol, contrary to
both the terms of the formula ordered and a federal regulation re-
quiring a label to state that it should not be fed to breeding or dairy
cattle.
The trial court believed expert testimony that the amount of stil-
bestrol in the feed would not have caused the abortions and sterility,
and, accordingly, found no breach of contract. On appeal, the su-
preme court stated that, even absent proof of causation, the plain-
tiffs were at least entitled to nominal damages, for community
knowledge of what their herd had eaten would greatly diminish the
value of their property from breed cattle to beef cattle. Clearly the
tainted feed constituted breaches of the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose.
Central Soya argued that under the authority of Miller, it could
not be held liable for breach of any implied warranty because it was
not in vertical privity with the appellants. In overruling the vertical
privity aspect of Miller, Justice Roberts reiterated the rationale that
he and Justice Jones had expressed in their Miller dissents: Vertical
privity shields from liability the party primarily responsible both for
the defective product and the inducement that led to its pur-
chase-the manufacturer.234 Furthermore, preventing the plaintiff
233. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968). As an aside, with respect to the vertical privity issue
in Miller, Justice Roberts dissented from the majority opinion, per Justice Cohen. In Kassab,
the majority, per Justice Roberts, overruled the Miller vertical privity holding, while Justice
Cohen concurred in the result, but disassociated himself from the court's "abolition of the
privity of contract doctrine in actions instituted for breach of warranty." Id. at 237, 246 A.2d
at 858.
234. Justice Roberts eloquently stated his position as follows:
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from proceeding directly against the remote seller or manufacturer
will not insulate those defendants from liability in the absence of
disclaimers and limitations of liability. As a matter of law, the
remote party may be required to indemnify the last retailer.
2 3
Hence, the vertical privity defense simply exposes the injured party
to the risk that his immediate seller may be financially unable to
make the plaintiff whole and fosters "needless and bothersome cir-
cuity of actions. 2 3Foretelling the direction of products liability in Pennsylvania,
Justice Roberts declared that section 402A and the Code must be
co-extensive.n? With regard to vertical privity, this declaration was
based upon strong footing. Such perfect symmetry between war-
ranty and strict liability, however, has yet to be achieved.
The Miller court had reasoned that by limiting horizontally those
who benefited from the Code's implied and express warranties, sec-
tion 2-318 impliedly prohibited any further relaxation of privity
strictures vertically. The Kassab court, on the other hand, found the
section silent as to the vertical privity problem. Either a reading of
[Tihe typical consumer does not deal at arm's length with the party whose product
he buys. Rather, he buys from a retail merchant who is usually little more than an
economic conduit. It is not the merchant who has defectively manufactured the prod-
uct. Nor is it usually the merchant who advertises the product on such a large scale
as to attract consumers. We have in our society literally scores of large, financially
responsible manufacturers who place their wares in the stream of commerce not only
with the realization, but with the avowed purpose, that these goods will find their way
into the hands of the consumer. Only the consumer will use these products; and only
the consumer will be injured by them should they prove defective. Yet the law in
Pennsylvania continued to permit these manufacturers to escape contractual liability
for harm caused consumers by defective merchandise simply because the manufac-
turer technically did not sell directly to the consumer. There was no privity of contract
between them. No one denied the existence of absolute liability under the code for
breach of implied warranty. But this warranty ran not to the injured party, but rather
to the middleman who merely sold to the injured party, thus ignoring commercial
reality and encouraging multiplicity of litigation.
Id. at 227-28, 246 A.2d at 853.
235. See Frankel v. Lull Eng'r Corp., 334 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd per curiam
470 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1973); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970); Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Corp., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd
407 F.2d 87 (1969); Tronza v. Tecumseh Prod. Co., 253 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd in
part, vacated in part 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Note, The Right to Indemnity in Products
Liability Cases, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 614.
236. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 419, 221 A.2d 320, 338 (1966) (Roberts, J., concurring
and dissenting); accord, Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968).
237. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 231, 246 A.2d 848, 854 (1968).
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the section or Comment 3 could reinforce this holding. Whether
looking to "developing case law" or "general principles of
[contract] law," 38 the court concluded that the same policies un-
derlying the food cases supported the abandonment of the doctrine
in cases of injury caused by all other products.239 Thus, the vertical
privity doctrine in Pennsylvania was forever laid to rest.
HORIZONTAL PRIVITY-RECENT PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
TREATMENT
The uncertainty surrounding the horizontal privity defense in
Pennsylvania was increased when Justice Roberts, in declaring the
Kassab court's nonadherence to Miller, stated that "the Code sets
an absolute limit on those injured parties who may seek shelter
under the umbrella of a manufacturer's warranty . ". .. , The
court thus pronounced that section 2-318's three categories of third
party beneficiaries were the extent to which the court could permit
the disregard of the strictures of horizontal privity.21 This declara-
tion by Justice Roberts was but a temporary departure from his
Miller position that developing case law was intended to determine
the ultimate scope of warranty protection1 2 and a parting deference
to the echos of the cry of judicial restraint.1
238. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.
239. 432 Pa. at 234, 246 A.2d at 856. In Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d
903 (Pa. 1974), the court summarized these policies:
First, the public interest in the protection of human life justifies the imposition upon
consumer products suppliers of full responsibility for harm resulting from use of the
products. Second, as we have stated, the manufacturer by marketing and advertising
the product impliedly represents that it is safe for the intended use and society should
not allow him to avoid responsibility. Finally, multiplicity of actions will be avoided
by permitting a direct action by the injured party against the manufacturer ....
Id. at 908 n.15.
240. 432 Pa. at 232, 246 A.2d at 855.
241. See Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1971) (applying Pennsylvania
law); Tucker v. Capitol Mach. Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
Professor'Murray wrote in his fine work in this area, published prior to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in Salvador: "Under the present circumstances, however, Hochgertel
lives on as an irrational shackle in the Pennsylvania products liability picture." Murray,
supra note 7, at 402.
242. 422 Pa. at 417, 420-21, 221 A.2d at 337-39 (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting).
243. Justice Cohen wrote that the majority completely lacked judicial restraint by over-
turning the long-established privity defense. He stated that the question was not the proper
subject for review and was, accordingly, rather superficially treated by the parties. 432 Pa.
at 237-40, 246 A.2d at 858-59. In response, Justice Roberts painstakingly established the
vertical privity issue as one properly before the court. Id. at 225, 246 A.2d 851-52. See
generalhy Murray, supra note 7, at 410-16.
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Possibly, the greater deviation between section 2-318 and Com-
ment 3 for horizontal privity may account for the court's less liberal
treatment of that defense. More importantly, the question 'of duty
to the injured party " ' is stretched to greater extremes as one moves
along the horizontal plane. Nevertheless, the recent trend has ex-
tended protection beyond the designated class of third party benefi-
ciaries.24 ' The fact that the Code specifies those to whom the seller's
warranty extends is not necessarily indicative of a legislative deter-
mination that more remote users, consumers or those affected by
the goods, may not also benefit by the Code's warranty protection.
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions, the family, household, and guests of the purchaser.
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to en-
large or restrict the developing case law . . 246
Since the comments are not the law, but rather aids in the in-
terpretive process, Comment 3's assurance that "the section . . is
not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law" with
respect to either horizontal or vertical privity is advisory at best.
Comment 3's expressed reliance upon the "developing case law"
would seem to be a distinct preservation of the earlier Spring 1950
Proposed Final Draft's concept of foreseeability.247 The Miller
court's consideration of the enumeration of beneficiaries as a limita-
tion and Comment 3's language as precatory, 4 was short-lived.
Justice Roberts, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller
and his later opinions in Kassab and Salvador, accepted the ration-
ale proposed by Comment 3 and gave it the force of law.
In view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's initial handling of
section 2-318 in Hochgertel, Justice Roberts' reliance on Comment
3 was not unwarranted. In Hochgertel, plaintiff bartender was in-
jured by an exploding bottle of unopened soda water which was
standing on the counter behind the bar. Since the product was
244. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 424, 221 A.2d 320, 341 (1966) (Roberts, J., concurring
and dissenting).
245. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 905 n.9 (Pa. 1974).
246. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3.
247. See note 204 supra and accompanying textual discussion. White and Summers wrote
that the explanation for the expansion by a comment of its section's scope is "partly political.
When opponents of a draft section prevailed against the draftsman, the draftsman would
sometimes revise the draft accordingly, but seek to preserve the old draft in the comments
.... " WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 135, at 12.
248. 422 Pa. at 393, 221 A.2d at 325.
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bottled, sold and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff's em-
ployer, a pure question of horizontal privity was raised: Did the
well-established implied warranty of merchantability of foodstuffs
extend to the employee of the purchaser?
Obviously, equipment and supplies purchased by an employer for
use in his business will be handled by the purchaser's employee.
However, the Hochgertel court analyzed the developing case law
and concluded: "He is a complete stranger to any contractual trans-
action involved. 1245 The employee could garner no aid from section
2-318, for the court concluded that the language clearly was in-
tended to protect only those specifically enumerated. These cOnclu-
sions were founded upon a misinterpretation of the drafters' inten-
tions to defer to the "developing case law" as directed in Comment
3, 70 a misapprehension of Connecticut law, 25' an undue reliance
upon vertical privity cases, 2s and a fallacious "inescapable conclu-
sion from Loch v. Confair.'253 Since the case apparently held that
249. 409 Pa. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578.
250. Murray, supra note 7, at 399-400, 402. Professor Murray suggests that Justice
Eagen's paraphrase of Comment 3 in Hochgertel which deletes the word "developing" (409
Pa. at 614, 187 A.2d at 578) was indicative of the court's view that if the state's case law had
gone beyond the enumerated beneficiaries prior to Code section 2-318's enactment then the
section would not restrict the categories to those enumerated. But if the state's case law had
not gone beyond those enumerated, then the section constituted the furthest extensions of
the Code's warranty protection.
In Salvador. Justice Roberts apparently subscribed to Professor Murray's conception of
Comment 3 ("to permit further judicial extensions of the three categories expressed in section
2-318 .... .. Murray, supra note 7, at 402) when he declared:
Though we must overrule Hochgertel, this is not an occasion when a court reexam-
ines its precedents and finding them in error returns to a "correct" view. On the
contrary, as we have said, when Hochgertel was decided it was clearly the appropriate
accommodation between the law of torts and the law of contracts. Since then Pennsyl-
vania products liability law has progressed, and demands of public policy as well as
legal symmetry compel today's decision.
319 A.2d at 908.
251. The court cited Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A.2d 647 (1954)
for the proposition that an employee was not within one of the categories specified in section
2-318. The court mistakenly thought the plaintiff in Duart was a maid in the buyer's home.
Instead, she was a day cook in a fraternity house. That fact, of course, supported the court's
decision. What detracted from its holding was the overturning of Duart in Connolly v. Hagi,
24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963) a month after Hochgertel was decided. In Connolly,
a service station attendant was allowed recovery from the manufacturer of an automobile
despite his lack of both horizontal and vertical privity.
252. The court relied upon the food and beverage cases cited in 409 Pa. at 614, 187 A.2d
at 578, which were directed toward the vertical privity defense. Murray, supra note 7, at 400.
253. 409 Pa. at 615, 187 A.2d at 578, "[T]he inescapable conclusion from Loch v. Confair
. is that no warranty will be implied in favor of one who is not in the category of a
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one not in the distributive chain (a purchaser, subpurchaser or pur-
chaser's designated beneficiaries) may not benefit from the Code's
express or implied warranties, the case could easily be cited for its
vertical privity aspects.
One year later in Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co. ,24 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court signaled a trend toward the mitigation and eventual
destruction of the forceful privity defense announced in Hochgertel.
In Yentzer, the plaintiff employee was similarly injured by an ex-
ploding bottle, but was not denied recovery because of lack of priv-
ity between him and the bottler. The legally relevant distinction
was that he personally purchased defendant's champagne on behalf
of his employer. By labeling the plaintiff a "buyer" within the
meaning of sections 2-103(1)(a) and 2-318, the court refused to
extend Hochgertel's rigid construction of section 2-318 to "the ac-
tual purchaser" despite the plaintiff's employee character.2 11
Justice Eagen, who authored Hochgertel, correctly viewed this
holding as "a clear departure" from his opinion of the year before.
In his dissent he bared the majority's logic: plaintiff purchased no
interest in the goods; he was merely acting as an agent on behalf of
his principal in whom the title and interest vested."'
However unsound the Yentzer holding may be, the virtues of
social justice were allied with the majority. Though one can only
speculate as to the arguments among the justices, a novel considera-
tion was raised by Justice Eagen in his majority opinion in
Hochgertel and his dissent in Yentzer: To allow the employee to
recover would render the manufacturer a guarantor of his product.
purchaser.". Actually, the court in Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949), held in
that vertical privity case, that the plaintiffs could not sustain an action for breach of warranty
for injuries resulting from a bottle which exploded as the plaintiff took it from the supermar-
ket shelf. Since the plaintiffs could not prove a contractual relationship (the accident hap-
pened prior to purchase), no warranty existed. "Why the Hochgertel court felt that this case
was authority for the proposition that only actual purchasers could sue as contrasted with
those in horizontal privity with such purchasers remains a mystery." Murray, supra note 7,
at 400-01.
254. 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
255. Since plaintiff was a buyer, he was within the distributive chain and the recognized
vertical privity food cases which permitted recovery by remote parties. Id. at 274-75, 199 A.2d
at 464.
256. Id. at 275-76, 199 A.2d at 464-65. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Miller,
Justice Roberts observed that "adherence to the dictates of privity" in the practically identi-,
cal cases of Hochgertel and Yentzer made the plaintiffs' rights of recovery "turn upon the




His fear of the spectre of absolute liability is hardly justified by the
extension of warranties to foreseeable plaintiffs. The question of
duty is by no means the end point of a products liability trial. To
the contrary, it is merely the beginning. The established elements
of a products liability trial" 7 render the fear of absolute liability
archaic. One is reminded of "the most absurd and outrageous con-
sequences" which concerned Lord Abinger in his disposition of
Winterbottom v. Wright.
A second, though weak, signal of the changing attitude of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court emanated from Nederostek v.
Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co.2 5 The court, per Justice Roberts, re-
versed the lower court's judgment on the pleadings for the defen-
dant despite the plaintiff's mere allegation that the shoes which
caused the plaintiffs injury were supplied by his employer who
purchased them from the defendant's reseller. The court, finding
the trial court in error because it improperly resorted to "deposi-
tions" to rule for the defendant, refused to summarily bar recovery
by the plaintiff on the basis of Hochgertel, simply because he was a
non-purchaser employee.
The problem in Nederostek was the connotation to be given to the
word "supplied." Obviously without a purchase by the employee,
the plaintiff's cause of action would have to fail since it would fall
squarely within Hochgertel. Again, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was quick to afford an individual the protected status which
it at first confined to those specified in section 2-318. In Nederostek,
it was not the court's conclusion that the employee was protected
which made the case significant, but its finding that the plaintiff
was not necessarily denied protection as a matter of law.
The Miller court continued this trend toward a relaxed attitude
concerning horizontal privity when, recognizing the remedial nature
of section 2-318 and the varied connotations of the word "family,"
it concluded that it could not give the term an unduly restrictive
meaning. Hence, the court permitted the administrator to pursue
his cause of action against the retailer defendant with the proviso
that he must also satisfy the foreseeability requirement of section
2-318: Not only must the nephew be in the buyer's family, but it
must also be "reasonable to expect that such person may use, con-
257. See Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325
(1971).
258. 415 Pa. 136, 202 A.2d 72 (1964).
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sume or be affected by the goods .. .. "259 This "factual and objec-
tive question" was required to be met by proof of such factors as
"the remoteness of the family relation, the geographical connection
between the buyer and the member of his family, and the nature of
the product."6 0 Professor Murray remarked that though these cri-
teria are "lawyerlike and create a workable test," they in actuality
mask the court's dissatisfaction with the Hochgertel decision.26'
Disagreeing with the majority's strict interpretation of section 2-
318, Justice Jones, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, ob-
served that the court's ad hoc method for determining whether an
individual falls within one of the section's categories is "unneces-
sary, impractical and unsound. '22 Justice Jones preferred, and this
writer subscribes to, an approach which permits the "developing
case law" of Pennsylvania to determine the extent of its warranty
protection.
Since Kassab nullified the vertical privity defense soon after its
reestablishment in Miller, the consequent uncertainty surrounding
Hochgertel's affirmation of the horizontal privity defense obligated
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to make a pronouncement with
respect to the rule's continued viability. In the spring of 1974, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,' per Justice Roberts, seized the oppor-
tunity to clarify this aspect of Pennsylvania's products liability law
in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.21 Overruling Hochgertel,
the Court appeared to write the final pages in the history of privity
of warranty. Although it is clear that the employee is by no means
the endpoint along the horizontal plane, the horizontal privity issue
still exists in some form.
In Salvador, the plaintiff allegedly suffered a considerable loss of
hearing as a result of an exploding steam boiler manufactured by
the defendant and sold by the retailer defendant to the plaintiff's
employer. With the elimination of vertical privity by Kassab, the
horizontal privity question paralleled the issue raised in Hochgertel
259. 422 Pa. at 390, 221 A.2d at 324, quoting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
260. Id.
261. Murray, supra note 7, at 404. "The opinion is an illustration of how courts attempt
to do justice by squeezing meritorious cases into acceptable categories."
262. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 403, 221 A.2d 320, 330 (1966). Section 2-318 "permits
the developing case law in each jurisdiction to determine how far the extension of the warran-
ties may go or whether any privity requirement should be retained." Id. at 405, 221 A.2d at
331.
263. 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974), aff'g 224 Pa. Super. 377, 307 A.2d 398 (1973).
1974
Duquesne Law Review
eleven years before. Finding Kassab's rationale equally applicable
to both privity defenses, the superior court, per Judge Cercone,
rejected the manufacturc 's preliminary objections that the plaintiff
was without standing to maintain his action for breach of implied
warranty.
The supreme court agreed with Judge Cercone's assessment of
Kassab's impact. Subsequent to the Hochgertel decision, section
402A and its accompanying social policy had been adopted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and Pennsylvania's law of products
liability had made substantial advances in the area of consumer
protection.264 To have eliminated privity in Hochgertel would have
made the manufacturer a "guarantor" of his product and would
have led to "harsh and unjust results.""2 5 By the time of the
Salvador decision, however, it was obvious that injustice to plain-
tiffs would likewise result from the retention of the requirement.
If one were to ask why the plaintiff would suffer so dramatically
from an adverse decision by the court, a superficial answer would
be forthcoming: "To permit the result of a lawsuit to depend solely
on the caption atop plaintiff's complaint is not now, and has never
been, a sound resolution of identical controversies."" 8
Interestingly, while the co-extensive recovery theory was suffi-
cient to resolve the privity issue, its adoption has left in its wake a
perplexing and unresolved issue. Professor Murray has suggested
that the adoption of the co-extensive theory requires a uniform pe-
riod of limitations for a product-related personal injury action under
both section 402A and the Code. 7 Indeed, Salvador presented this
issue, for the plaintiff had filed a summons in assumpsit some three
years, ten months and. seven days after the injury-producing explo-
sion. By that time the two year personal injury statute of limitations
applicable to actions for strict liability in tort had run.2 8 While the
superior court implied by citing Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas
Works,219 that the Code's four year statute of limitations 270 was appl-
264. Id. at 908.
265. Id. at 907.
266. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 229, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
267. Murray, Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 255, 260 (1973).
268. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
269. 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
270. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725. The four-year period commences when the cause
of action has accrued, which is at the moment of the breach, "regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach .... .. Id. In Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa.
Vol. 13: 53
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icable to this breach of warranty case,2"' the supreme court, on ap-
peal, did not deal with the issue.
Ironically, the "legal symmetry" which Justice Roberts sought to
achieve in Kassab and Salvador, in actuality, has produced the
"anomalous situation" which he desired to avoid.?2 Since Salvador
reached the supreme court on preliminary objections in the nature
of a demurrer, it is not inconceivable that the supreme court justices
will once again find Salvador argued before them on the issue of
statute of limitations. This should bring the court to the realization
that the establishment of a co-extensive relationship between strict
liability in tort and breach of warranty in product-related personal
injury litigation will demand strenuous legal research and attention
to all facets of products liability.
OBSERVATIONS
Parting reference to the Code's express extension of its warranty
protection to the designated beneficiaries and Justice Roberts' "ab-
solute limit" language in Kassab entails little theoretical grappling.
The former, in accordance with the-manifest intention of the draf-
ters, is not binding, and the latter was obviously an imprecise state-
ment in clear contradiction with his concurring and dissenting opin-
ion in Miller.
As a consequence of the adoption of strict liability in Pennsyl-
vania, the manufacturer has been charged with full responsibility
for his products' safety. Both Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec-
tion 402A and the Code make the manufacturer a guarantor of his
products, and are founded upon overlapping policies. "Why then
should the mere fact that the injured party is not himself the pur-
chaser deny recovery?"2 3 Kassab plainly answers that it should not.
Salvador concurs.
107, 113 & n.3, 207 A.2d 823, 826 & n.3 (1965), the court stated that the period runs, not from
the date of the occurrence of the accident, but from the time delivery of the goods was
tendered. Whatever logical connection must invariably exist between tender of delivery and
the typical personal injury situation defies explanation. To find "substantial change," the
absence of which must be proven by the plaintiff in his cause of action under section 402A,
from the mere passage of time is a non sequitur.
271. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 224 Pa. Super. 377, 386, 307 A.2d 398, 403
(1973).
272. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907-08 (Pa. 1974); Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 229-31, 246 A.2d 848, 853-54 (1968).
273. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1974).
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The difficulty with abolishing horizontal privity upon the identi-
cal rationale which brought about the passing of its vertical counter-
part is that in reality the two can be distinguished. They are simply
brothers, not twins. Kassab's solid foundation will not support full
elimination of the horizontal privity defense.
Undoubtedly Salvador was correctly decided. Under usual cir-
cumstances, a manufacturer expects his machinery and materials
to be used by the purchasing employer's employees, who would be
the ones susceptible to personal injury from a defectively manufac-
tured product. With regard to any implied warranty, the employee
stands in the shoes of his employer. 274 Indeed, the conception of an
employer in its corporate form receiving personal injuries is ludi-
crous. Accordingly, as a matter of public policy and accommodation
to section 2-318, the employee must be considered a member of the
employer's "industrial family. '275
Whether the same conclusion can be reached for individuals fur-
ther along the horizontal plane remains unresolved. Merely to state
that horizontal privity was weakened by Salvador does not solve the
issue with respect to non-employee bystanders,26 recipients of serv-
ices,21 passengers in automobiles 8 and airplanes,29 rescuers, 210 non-
purchasing customers,2' donees,2 12 lessees of goods, 213.bailees, 4 ten-
274. Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newson, 382 F.2d 395, 398 (10th Cir. 1967) noted in both
Salvador and Kassab; accord, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LABiLrrY § 10:22, at 378 (2d ed.
1974).
275. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 347, 353 P.2d 575, 581, 5 Cal. Rptr.
863, 869 (1960).
276. E.g., Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). See Note, Strict Liability and
the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 916, 924-27 (1964); Note, Piercing the Shield of Privity in
Products Liability-A Case for the Bystander, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 266 (1968).
277. E.g., Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Graham v. Botten-
field's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Gimino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 308 Mich.
666, 14 N.W.2d 536 (1944).
278. E.g., Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
279. E.g., Public Adm'r v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 224 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Seigel
v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Middleton v. United Aircraft
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
280. E.g., Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
281. E.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Matthews v. Lawnlite
Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
282. E.g., Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320
(1945); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927); cf. Brown v.
Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962), affg 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961) (borrower).
See also Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
283. E.g., Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963);
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ants,"8 5 vendees of realty,286 trespassers," 7 thieves,2 8 unborn chil-
dren289 and other potential plaintiffs which has long plagued negli-
gence law. Following the judicial treatment of the duty question in
negligence law would not be unwarranted. The public policy issues
raised by the duty question necessarily entail step-by-step advances
as a requisite to achieving a socially and economically just scheme
which fairly balances the competing interests involved in compen-
sating products-related injuries.
Through the adoption of section 2-318, the legislature has cast a
sales act into the arena of tort recovery. Consequently, sales law
must embrace the concept of the foreseeable plaintiff which had
previously been confined to negligence law. Professor Murray's "any
contemplated injured party"2 0 or Justice Roberts' "foreseeable
ambit of expectation 2' standards would meet the requirements of
the societal interest in compensating the plaintiff who "it is reason-
able to expect. . . may use, consume or be affected by the goods."2 92
The Salvador court declared that the Code was not dispositive of
this issue of horizontal privity, obliquely basing its conclusion on
the rationale in Kassab. As prescribed by Comment 3, the determi-
nation of the vertical and horizontal privity issues was gleaned from
the "developing case law. ' 23 And, subsequent horizontal inquiries
by the Pennsylvania courts will similarly be guided by the progres-
sion of law in tune with the demands of public policy. With respect
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); cf. Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
284. E.g., Heilman v. Hertz Corp., 306 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1962).
285. E.g., Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972). But see
Barry v. Ivarson, Inc., 249 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971).
286. Cf. Pollard v. Saxe & Yoles Dev. Co., 43 U.S.L.W. 2094 (Cal. Aug. 20, 1974); Aced
v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961).
287. See note 204 supra, at Comment 3.
288. All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay ....
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
289. E.g., Harley v. General Motors Corp., 97 Ga. App. 348, 103 S.E.2d 191 (1958).
290. This concept, as well as other thought-provoking issues, especially the application
of the Code's statute of limitation, were discussed by telephone conversation with Professor
Murray early in September, 1974.
291. Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 415, 221 A.2d 320, 336 (1966) (concurring and dissent-
ing).
292. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318.
293. Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 905, 908 (Pa. 1974); Kassab v.
Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 232-34, 246 A.2d 848, 855-56 (1968).
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to horizontal privity, the specification of the third party beneficiar-
ies in section 2-318 is obviously no longer exclusive. The enumera-
tion is merely excess baggage which appears to be an innocuous
vestige of the citadel of privity. However, a pernicious quality lin-
gers, for the section applies only to "injuries in person" as opposed
to (1) Alternative C to section 2-318 which follows the modern trend
of strict liability "in extending the rule beyond injuries to the per-
son" to any injury resulting from a breach of warranty24 and (2)
section 402A which allows recovery "for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .... "
This legislative disclaimer of property damage and economic loss
with respect to the purchaser's family, household and house guests
is totally incongruous with the Code's commercial context. Admit-
tedly, enumerated or unenumerated nonprivity plaintiffs should not
be entitled to recover for economic loss unless those damages re-
sulted from circumstances which the manufacturer or other seller
had or should have reasonably contemplated." 5 However, the draf-
ters' fear of allowing the nonprivity plaintiff to recover property
damages is +unfounded in reality, for both personal and property
damage arise out of commonly foreseeable circumstances.26
To make the plaintiffs recovery stand upon any foundation other
than foreseeability in a case of product-related injury would produce
unjust and inconsistent results. Presently, in actions for breach of
warranty, the purchaser can recover for all nonspeculative harm
caused by the defective product;27 the section 2-318 enumerated
294. See note 206 supra; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3.
295. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 135, at 324, 334 (accepting the doctrine of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854)).
296. "Many non-privity plaintiffs who today seek recovery for property damage now find
themselves in much the same position as those who seek recovery for personal injury." WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 135, at 332.
At the present time, the trend in Pennsylvania is to minimize any distinction between
personal injury, property damage and economic loss in both strict liability and breach of
warranty approaches. In an unreported opinion, Lockhart Iron & Steel Co. v. Cyclops Corp.,
Civil No. 3424 January Term, 1974 (C.P. Allegh., Pa., July 18, 1974), the court, per Louik,
J., interpreted a parenthetical comment by Justice Roberts in Kassab with respect to this
very point. Justice Roberts considered not only personal injury and property damage, as
expressly included in section 402A, but "all of the harm" recompensable in strict liability in
tort. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 231 n.7, 246 A.2d 848, 854-55 n.7. Though noting
that some of the judges in Miller and Webb v. Zern considered economic damages solely
recompensable under the Code, Judge Louik cited Justice Roberts' opinion and footnote 7 to
deny the defendants' preliminary objection that plaintiff may not recover his sole claim of
economic loss under section 402A.
297. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714 to -715.
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beneficiaries can recover for only their personal injuries.29 The issue
arises as to the extent of permissible recovery by unenumerated
beneficiaries. Incredibly, it would seem that nothing would preclude
the unenumerated from being able to recover to the same extent as
a purchaser, since they are not constrained by the section's limita-
tion to recovery for personal injuries. This, however, would reach an
absurd result by allowing certain members of the horizontal plane
the right to' greater recovery than others simply because they were
not expressly granted protection by the legislature. To afford the
unenumerated greater protection by virtue of their originally unpro-
tected character is another "anomalous situation" which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has sought to avoid in the law of products
liability. By granting the plaintiffs in Kassab rights of action for
economic harm and implying that in the appropriate case property
damage would also be recompensable, the court has placed the
vertical nonprivity plaintiffs in the same status as the purchaser.
Whether this rationale will again be utilized for enumerated and
unenumerated plaintiffs along the horizontal plane is yet to be re-
solved.
Either legislative abrogation of section 2-318, allowing section
402A to rightfully preempt the field of.products liability, or legisla-
tive adoption of Alternative C would accomplish a result consistent
with the demands of social policy. In the absence of such activity,
the courts should pursue the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's de-
clared purpose to make recovery for products-related injuries uider
either section 402A or the Code co-extensive.
DAVID S. POLLOCK
298. Id. § 2-318, Alternative A maintains the distinction between property damage and
personal injury. See Id. Comment 3; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 135, at 332-33.
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